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I. INTRODUCTION
Before April 9, 1981, when the City of New York adopted a land
use policy as part of a comprehensive program to govern the transfor-
mation of lofts' into housing, the loft conversion market had been
operating for about ten years in a unique position: loft conversion
1. The New York City Planning Commission defines "loft" as follows:
A type of building generally constructed prior to 1930 for commercial and manu-
facturing use, and which is now or has been occupied by manufacturing tenants.
A loft building is constructed such that it covers most of its lot, leaving relatively
little open space. The interior has few columns and, therefore, has large unen-
cumbered space.
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entirely was unregulated by the city or state. The history of loft con-
version and the changing social, economic, and aesthetic values that
influenced it-and that it in turn influenced-provide a rare opportu-
nity to examine the effects of the free market working unhindered in
the realm of urban housing.
This Article examines the combination of pressures that caused
conversions of industrial space to residential use, considers the effects
of conversion on a city that depends upon its industrial tenants, and
explores the reasons conversions went unregulated for so long. The
Article concludes with an evaluation of the city's response to the
problem-its loft program.
The urban renewal efforts of the 1950s and 1960s heralded large
scale local and federal government intervention to induce private in-
vestment in urban areas. The public as well as the architectural and
planning professions accepted the efforts to revive inner city areas by
removing slums and blight. Blocks of older buildings were leveled
because they were inadequate according to the standards of the time
and were replaced by buildings designed under contemporary plan-
ning and design theories.
In the 1960s the South of Houston Street Industrial Area (SoHo),
which contains a large concentration of mid- to late-nineteenth cen-
tury loft buildings, was slated for clearance and rebuilding with high-
rise housing and a major east-west arterial highway. SoHo was not
razed, however, mainly because of the New York City Planning
Commission's decision, based on Chester Rapkin's 1963 study for the
Commission,2 which identified this locale as an important industrial
job center. The highway was never built because of public
opposition.3
Nevertheless, the area immediately north of SoHo, which con-
tained the same type of loft buildings, was designated for urban re-
newal and leveled. Two housing projects4 were completed in the
mid-1950s and 1960s: they were high-rise apartment buildings lo-
cated in an expanse of open space. By the 1970s, though, this ethic-
NEW YORK CITY PLANNING COMMISSION, LoFTs: BALANCING THE EQUITIES 150
(1981).
2. C. RAPKIN, THE SOUTH HOUSTON INDUSTRIAL AREA (Report for the City
Planning Commission, 1963).
3. In 1969, Mayor John V. Lindsay dropped the highway project in the midst of a
close re-election campaign. Mayor Drops Plansfor Express Roads Across 2 Boroughs,
N.Y. Times, July 17, 1969, at 1, col. 2.
4. Silver Towers (1966) and Washington Square Village (1956-1958).
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that new is better-gradually lost momentum because of increasing
public acceptance of what preservationists had repeatedly stated: in-
trinsic and irreplaceable values are associated with older buildings.
Public perception had so changed by 1973 that the formerly doomed
SoHo was formally designated the "SoHo Cast-Iron Historic
District."
In place of clearance, SoHo and later other loft neighborhoods un-
derwent a new, but no less drastic, form of urban renewal. The loft
buildings remained standing, but their new occupants altered loft in-
teriors to accommodate residential use.
In response to this new phenomenon, beginning in 1964,5 the state
and city adopted a series of amendments to the State Multiple Dwell-
ing Law6 and the City Zoning Resolution 7 to permit artists to live in
lofts. In 19768 and 1977' the city and state again amended these laws
to allow limited residential occupancy of lofts by nonartists. In spite
5. In 1964, the city adopted the administrative policy of "artist in residence"
(AIR), which gave property owners the option to allow up to two residential units in
their commercial and industrial buildings irrespective of the zoning district, without
changing the certificate of occupancy to a multiple dwelling. (By state law, a multiple
dwelling contains three or more dwelling units.). The AIR option acknowledged the
reality that some people, primarily artists, chose to live in an unconventional housing'
unit. At the time, lofts were perceived as the habitat for artists only. The AIR option
allowed an artist to live legally in a nonresidential building under a commercial lease
if the unit had minimum egress and fire protection.
6. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW §§ 275-78 (McKinney 1974 & Supp. 1983-84).
7. The present New York City Zoning Resolution, enacted in 1961, reflected the
land use policy of its day by strictly dividing the city into three types of zoning dis-
tricts: 1) manufacturing districts, which allow manufacturing and commercial uses
and permit no residential use; 2) commercial districts, which permit commercial and
residential uses, but no manufacturing uses; and 3) residential districts, which allow
residential use but no commercial or manufacturing use. In 1971, individuals in the
SoHo manufacturing district-mostly artists-successfully petitioned the city to allow
artist use of certain buildings by creating a new manufacturing use group-"joint
living work quarters for artists." This mixed-use zoning-artists coexisting with man-
ufacturers-was applauded because it gave those living there illegally a means to le-
galize their status without a variance and also provided a mechanism for the creation
of future artist housing from mostly vacant lofts. By excluding the general residential
population from SoHo it was thought that the conversion market could be limited,
and manufacturers and artists would live together successfully because the artist was
a small manufacturer, thus providing a compatible use.
8. In 1976, the city also rezoned NoHo (North of Houston Street), a manufactur-
ing district, to allow "joint living work quarters for artists" in certain buildings. In
the same year the city rezoned Tribeca (Triangle below Canal Street), a manufactur-
ing district south of SoHo with a large illegal residential community, to permit artists
and general residential use with certain restrictions.
9. The New York State Legislature amended N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW §§ 275-78
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of these well-intentioned statutes, nearly all loft conversion was done
illegally: the conversions did not have residential certificates of occu-
pancy which indicate that the zoning permitted residential use and
that the minimum standards for fire protection, egress, light, and air
as set forth in the building code, Multiple Dwelling Law, and other
codes were met.
In addition, many conversions were illicit in other ways. Some
conversions took place in areas where zoning permitted residential
use, but without the filing of plans for the work with the city. In
other instances, landlords leased space for residential use under com-
mercial leases that prohibited these uses. Sometimes landlords sold
space in buildings without the offering plan required by state law.
The new form of urban renewal proved as controversial as its pred-
ecessor, but not primarily because of its illegalities. Manufacturers,
artists, other "pioneer" early residential loft tenants, more affluent
second-generation loft residents, property owners, developers, com-
munity groups, and civic organizations discovered they were in com-
petition with each other. Because of the widespread illegality, the
competition had no rules.
New York's comprehensive loft program is an attempt to provide a
set of rules to structure the competition. The city's approach is aptly
characterized by the City Planning Commission as "balancing the eq-
uities."" ° In a competition between legitimate land uses, there is no
right or wrong. Each position is meritorious.
(McKinney 1974 & Supp. 1983-84), known as Article 7B, to include occupancy stan-
dards for general residential use as well as artists' use in 1977.
10. Norman Marcus, counsel to the New York City Planning Commission, first
applied the term "balancing the equities" to lofts. The panel he organized and
chaired, "Loft Conversion: Balancing the Equities," was held on December 8, 1980,
at The Association of the Bar of the City of New York.
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MANHATTAN LOFT NEIGHBORHOODS
LOWER MANHATTAN CBD
WASHINGTON MARKET/ TRIBECA
SOHO NOHO
GRAPHIC ARTS CENTER
WEST VILLAGE
MEAT MARKET
NORTHEAST VILLAGE
SOUTHEAST CHELSEA
NORTHEAST CHELSEA
GARMENT CENTER
GARMENT CENTER EAST
MADISON PARK AVENUES
WEST CHELSEA ICLINTON
UNION SQUARE
12
'P
10.
SZoning Districts
MANUFACTURING
Manufacturing and
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/ COMMERCIAL
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ing manufacturing uses
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--]MIXED USE
Manufacturing and
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uses; limited residential
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[] MANUFACTURINGFURTHER STUDY NEEDED
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II. EVOLUTION OF MANUFACTURING IN MANHATTAN
In the heated competition and debate among loft interest groups,
there is one element on which all sides agree: heavy industrial use of
space in Manhattan is the product of another era.
Manufacturing grew in Manhattan in an age when the transporta-
tion system precluded the dispersion of factories far from their cus-
tomers, suppliers, and workers. When overland freight movement
was limited to a choice between horse and wagons or railroads, and
workers traveled to work primarily by foot or streetcar, Manhattan
offered substantial locational advantages over other parts of the New
York metropolitan area. Manhattan also coupled a seemingly end-
less supply of low-wage immigrant labor with excellent port facilities.
Thus, by 1919 Manhattan contained the largest concentration of in-
dustrial activity in the nation, accounting for nearly 387,000 jobs."
To accommodate this industrial activity, developers built manufac-
turing lofts over large areas of Manhattan, 2 either through new con-
struction or the reuse of economically or locationally obsolete
commercial buildings. In the years immediately following the Civil
War these buildings tended to be in lower Manhattan. They were
primarily five- or six-story buildings of masonry or cast iron, the
latter a precursor of the modern skyscraper developed by James Bo-
gardus and others. 3 For their day, these buildings offered manufac-
turers large unobstructed operating spaces, with fourteen to twenty-
five feet between columns or walls. Elisha Otis' development of a
practical elevator, first used in the Haughwout Building in SoHo in
1857, made possible the use of the upper floors for production and
goods movement. 4
With the advent of steel as a building material, the last decades of
the nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth century
saw the construction of taller and larger loft buildings, mostly in
newer industrial districts in "midtown south"-Manhattan between
14th and 42nd Streets, north of the older districts. Because of the
heavy loads these industrial buildings were designed to support, col-
11. DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, CITY ASSISTANCE FOR SMALL MANUFAC-
TURERS 18 (rev. draft Mar. 1982).
12. L. Kahn, The Loft Building in the Central Business District of Manhattan 7-
27 (1963) (unpublished thesis, Pratt Institute).
13. M. GAYLE & E. GILLION, JR., CAST IRON ARCHITECTURE IN NEW YORK X-
xiii (1974).
14. N. WHITE & E. WILLENSKY, AIA GUIDE TO NEW YORK CITY 48 (1978).
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untn spacing generally remained at or below twenty-five feet. By
1920, Manhattan contained one hundred seventy-five million square
feet of loft space. 5
In the 1920s Manhattan began to lose its advantages as a location
for manufacturing. In 1924, Congress restricted immigration from
southern and eastern Europe, then the major source of New York
City's immigrant labor pool. At the same time, the increasing use of
trucks for goods movement and automobiles for commuting opened
vast new areas for industrial use within the New York metropolitan
area and throughout the country.' 6 Attempting to remain competi-
tive, Manhattan builders constructed newer, more modern industrial
buildings that resulted in the creation of the Garment and Graphic
Arts Centers 7 with still taller and larger buildings. As healthy indus-
tries moved to these newer facilities, fewer manufacturers occupied
the downtown lofts. In spite of the new facilities, Manhattan indus-
trial employment declined during the 1920s. Though the Depression
slowed the relocation of industry, general economic conditions re-
sulted in a continued loss of industrial jobs in Manhattan.
The combination of an increasing supply of industrial space with a
shrinking industrial base meant that the substantial numbers of in-
dustrial firms in Manhattan could choose between "modern" space in
the newer industrial neighborhoods at higher prices and "older"
space at lower prices. The older post-Civil War industrial neighbor-
hoods became occupied, on the whole, by activities that often could
not supply sufficient rental income to ensure the long-term mainte-
nance and code compliance of their buildings."8
Although a surge in manufacturing employment associated with
World War II doubled New York City's industrial workforce, manu-
facturing's reprieve was short-lived. 9 With postwar prosperity, there
was a dramatic increase in the availability of the automobile and
truck, as well as improved roads. The containerized cargo ship fur-
15. See DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, supra note 11, at 17 (estimates pre-
pared by John Stern of Tri-State Regional Planning Commission).
16. Zukin, Loft Living as "istoric Compromise" in the Urban Core: The New
York Experience, 6 INT'L J. URB. & REGIONAL RESEARCH 260 (1982).
17. L. Kahn, supra note 12, at 25, 35.
18. C. RAPKIN, supra note 2, at 291-92.
19. DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, supra note 11, at 18, 27. Manufacturing
jobs, however, are not necessarily production jobs. They may not even be located at a
facility where production takes place.
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ther reduced the advantages conveyed by New York's rail lines and
docks. New methods of production encouraged the use of one-story
operations not available in central city locations such as Manhattan.
Between 1947 and 1969, New York City's industrial employment de-
clined by twenty-three percent. During the next six years it dropped
by another twenty-seven percent from its 1947 total.2" By 1976 no
less than twenty million square feet of Manhattan loft space stood
vacant. Nevertheless, 537,000 jobs classified as manufacturing re-
mained in New York City in 1975, of which 294,000 were in
Manhattan.
Ideally, the city would like to encourage conversion while retaining
industrial jobs. To a certain extent, this is possible. Because of man-
ufacturing's continuing long-term decline in New York, some loft
space constantly becomes available for conversion, although not at
an annual rate sufficient to meet the demand for housing.21 Between
1975 and 1980, industrial employment in Manhattan declined by
17,600,22 a rate of 3,520 per year. At that rate, an estimated 1,056,000
to 1,408,000 square feet of loft space is made available each year by
vacating manufacturers. At least a portion of this decline in manu-
facturing is attributable to firms that conversion displaced and that
did not relocate within New York City.23 Between twenty and thirty
million square feet of loft space have been converted to date,24 al-
most all of it during the 1970s. In the past few years, the average
annual residential demand has been for one to two million square
feet of loft space more than industry was vacating, without account-
ing for the competition for manufacturing space from commercial
users.
Because of the substantial vacancies that resulted from the rapid
loss of industrial jobs in New York between 1969 and 1975, this
shortfall presented no problem initially. By 1979, however, with the
vacancies mostly filled, displacement of manufacturers was common-
20. Id. at 27.
21. Id. at 39, 216.
22. Id at 33 (citing New York State Department of Labor Statistics).
23. As part of the Department of City Planning's work on lofts between 1978 and
1980, staff members followed the experiences of firms along Broadway in SoHo and
NoHo that had contacted the city because conversion was threatening to displace
them. By 1980, 14% of these jobs had left the city or the firms had closed. At least
20% of the original total were in businesses that had not yet moved.
24. DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, supra note 11, at 212.
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place.2" A 1980 study2 6 found a vacancy rate in Manhattan's four
most important industrial areas of less than two percent.
III. EVOLUTION OF HOUSING IN MANHATTAN'S LOFT BUILDINGS
Who seeks to live in lofts that are becoming increasingly more
scarce?
Artists and craftspeople popularly are recognized as the first group
to use lofts as places to live and work. Their decision to live and
work in the same space is an individual and economic choice rather
than the product of an intrinsic need to have both together. Actually,
only a small percentage of the New York Standard Metropolitan Sta-
tistical Area's artists live in lofts.2 7 Nonetheless, the combination of a
need for open spaces with high ceilings to produce large works, the
image of certain locales as providing proximity to other artists and
other lifestyle attributes, and the economics of combining a home
and studio led to the growth of artists' communities in loft neighbor-
hoods in Manhattan after World War II.
Just as earlier in the twentieth century, when Greenwich Village
was a low-rent neighborhood that became a Bohemian center (later
to evolve into a conventional neighborhood), other artists' neighbor-
hoods were established at Tenth Street, Coenties Slip, the Bowery,
and the East Village after World War II.2 In the 1950s an artists'
community was located on East Tenth Street between Third and
Fourth Avenues known as "Tenth Street," with "artists' studios, the
Club, the galleries, the street itself and the Cedar Tavern. . .[that]
combined to create an inspiring environment."2 9 By the mid-1950s
25. J. Ross, Manufacturing Loft Conversion 2-4 (Dec. 5, 1979) (unpublished
memorandum, United Hatters, Cap, and Millinery Workers International Union).
26. NEw YORK CITY PLANNING COMMISSION, supra note I, at 38 (Real Estate
Board of New York Study).
27. According to the 1970 United States Census, New York City, Westchester,
Rockland, Nassau, and Suffolk counties had a population of actors, dancers, musi-
cians, composers, painters, sculptors, photographers, writers, artists, and entertainers
not elsewhere classified of 40,418. The 1977 Kristina Ford study identified 44.9% of
illegal lofts with households headed by artists. K. FORD, HOUSING POLICY AND THE
URBAN MIDDLE CLASS (1978). In 1983, the Loft Board estimated that there were
6,000 illegal loft units that would indicate 2,694 artists in illegal lofts. The Ford study
also estimated that of the heads of all loft households-legal and illegal-24.3% were
artists. Assuming that there are 14,000 loft units city-wide-legal and illegal-this
would yield an artist loft population of 3,402.
28. J. STRATTON, PIONEERING IN THE URBAN WILDERNESS 30 (1977).
29. J. BARD, TENTH STREET DAYS THE Co-OP'S OF THE 50's iii (1977).
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other artists, particularly some former Tenth Street artists,30 moved
to Coenties Slip near the southern tip of lower Manhattan. This
community remained until developers rebuilt the area with high-rise
office buildings in the mid- to late-1960s. The 1970s saw the rise of
the distinctly identifiable loft neighborhoods of SoHo, NoHo (North
of Houston Street), and Tribeca (Triangle below Canal) amidst en-
claves of manufacturers.
Initially, the most desirable buildings for residential use were the
smallest, oldest and, therefore, the most obsolete for manufacturing,
with antiquated elevators and deteriorating physical structures. Be-
cause these types of buildings were the least wanted by manufactur-
ers, they had the lowest rents and the most vacancies. Yet, because of
their desirability as a housing resource, the value of these properties
as parking lots was not high enough to justify demolishing the
buildings.
The early loft neighborhoods, although desolate after working
hours, were on the periphery of the established residential neighbor-
hoods of Greenwich Village, Little Italy, and Chinatown where resi-
dential amenities were located.
By the mid-1970s the character and location of residential use of
lofts had changed. The makeup of the residential population wid-
ened from predominantly artists to a broader spectrum of residents
that were more affluent and employed in careers with more upward
mobility. Articles extolling the joys of living in an industrial neigh-
borhood reflected and stimulated the wider acceptance of loft living.
Fran Lebowitz succintly described this transition of users and uses in
SoHo:
One day a Big Artist realized that if he took all of the sewing
machines and bales of rags out of a three-thousand-square-foot
loft and put in a bathroom and kitchen he would be able to live
and make Big Art in the same place. He was quickly followed
by other Big Artists and they by Big Lawyers, Big Boutique
Owners, and Big Rich Kids. Soon there was a SoHo and it was
positively awash in hardwood floors, talked-to plants, indoor sw-
ings, enormous record collections, hiking boots, Conceptual art-
ists, video communes, Art book stores, Art grocery stores, Art
restaurants, Art bars, Art galleries, and boutiques selling tie-
dyed raincoats, macrame flower pots, and Art Deco salad
30. J. STRATrON, supra note 28, at 24.
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plates.3 '
This shift and growth of users increased the demand and prices for
loft space. The higher price also shrunk the typical size of a loft.
Originally, conversion took place ad hoc within buildings as individ-
ual floors became vacant. When the demand for lofts increased, en-
tire buildings were emptied for luxury conversions.
Part of the reason that loft conversion became popular with devel-
opers was that it was cheaper to create lofts than to build new con-
ventional apartment buildings. Loft conversion was clearly more
profitable for the building owners than industrial use. In 1979, the
Department of City Planning compared costs per square foot for loft
buildings. Residential use in a legal apartment in a converted build-
ing or in a conventional apartment building rented for $10.00 per
square foot compared to $2.75 to $4.00 per square foot for a unit in
an illegally-converted building. The Department found that
although industrial use is profitable, the potential for increased profit
is far greater from residential use. The return on a rental building
with a 25 percent equity investment was 11.4 percent for industrial
space, 35.4 percent for an illegal, partially-converted building, 100
percent for an illegal, completely-converted building, 3.2 percent for
a legal residential building without tax benefits, and 17.6 percent for
a legal residential building which qualifies for tax relief.32 More re-
munerative than any of these was the sale of both legal and illegal
residential cooperatives in formerly industrial and commercial build-
ings. There, profits were as high as six hundred percent.
As the conversion market heated up, the focus shifted from "obso-
lete" smaller buildings, undesirable for manufacturers and often hav-
ing high vacancies, to large buildings, often occupied with industrial
tenants. Developers wanted the larger buildings because of the econ-
omies of scale (a greater number of units per building and lower de-
velopment cost whether the conversion be legal or illegal), increased
residential demand, and an exhaustion of the supply of smaller build-
ings. As a result, the competition between manufacturing and resi-
dential users heightened.
By the end of the 1970s, converted lofts were scattered throughout
Manhattan south of 59th Street irrespective of zoning regulations.
Those desiring further isolation to escape Manhattan's burgeoning
31. F. LEBOWITZ, METROPOLITAN LIFE 158 (1978).
32. DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, MANHATTAN LOFT CONVERSION PROPO-
SAL 17 (1980).
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loft market, or to pay less rent, moved to the Brooklyn and Queens
waterfront manufacturing districts. They found, however, that they
could not escape "future shock":33 each new area developed more
rapidly than the previous one. While at least two decades had passed
in Manhattan between the first generation of loft dwellers living ille-
gally and the legal luxury development, the time between the first
illegal generation and the luxury generation in Brooklyn was merely
a few years.
The legal status of a conversion did not concern developers or pro-
spective loft dwellers. Conversion occurred wherever the market-
place chose. Zoning and code enforcement against illegal conversion
was nonexistent before 1978 and sporadic between 1978 and 1981 be-
cause municipal officials perceived conversion as inherently "good."
It was not until the late 1970s that they heard otherwise.
During this period, public officials either were naive or emulated
ostriches. They did not know the extent of illegal conversion in Man-
hattan, nor did they know that the zoning changes for SoHo in 1971
and for NoHo and Tribeca in 1976 had little effect in either produc-
ing legal conversions or legalizing existing illegal ones. City planners
were under the impression that the 1970s zoning changes were solv-
ing the zoning impediment by making conversion legal. In an aston-
ishing demonstration of a lack of foresight and an absence of
hindsight, the city and state adopted and amended the zoning regula-
tions and Multiple Dwelling Law over several years with no consid-
eration of how they would work, nor any study after adoption to see
if they produced the desired results. Inherent in the response was the
gut notion that conversion was without fault. City officials viewed
conversion as a means of revitalizing vacant and underused space
while providing residents with a chance to find homes in a housing
market that had become extremely tight.
A look at the history of the conventional housing market in New
York City shows how this market pressure developed. New Yorkers
share the American dream of owning a single-family house on a
quarter acre of land. In the post-World War II period, the develop-
ment of the suburbs met a large part of the New York region's hous-
33. A. TOFFLER, FUTURE SHOCK 2 (1971). In this Article, "future shock" refers to
disorientation arising from rapid changes without the opportunity to adjust. Toffler
defines it as "the shattering stress and disorientation that we induce in individuals by
subjecting them to too much change in too short a time" and describes it as "the
disease of change." Id.
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ing demand. Nevertheless, housing construction within the city
remained relatively strong throughout the 1950s, averaging thirty-two
thousand units annually." In 1963 sixty thousand new units35 were
built, a post-war high.
New York's housing market has changed dramatically since then
and these changes have played a major role in stimulating the de-
mand for converted lofts. To understand the interrelationship of
converted lofts to the city-wide housing market it is necessary to ex-
amine the impact of six factors: 1) the 1961 Zoning Resolution; 2) the
availability of vacant land and government housing programs;
3) household size; 4) race; 5) the attraction of Manhattan; and 6) rent
regulation.
A. Housing Production and the 1961 Zoning Resolution
The surge in housing construction in the early 1960s can only be
explained in the context of New York's adoption of the 1961 Zoning
Resolution.
In 1916, New York pioneered land use regulation in the United
States by importing the European concept of zoning "to secure safety
from fire and other dangers and to promote the public health and
welfare, including so as conditions may permit, provision for ade-
quate light, air and convenience of access." 36 To accomplish this, the
Zoning Resolution regulated the height, bulk, and density of build-
ings, and the area of yards, courts, and open spaces.
While the Resolution prevented unlimited construction, it was rel-
atively liberal in its regulation of density. For a city that has never
surpassed the eight million mark in population, the Resolution theo-
retically permitted sufficient residential construction to house a popu-
lation of seventy million.37 To ensure adequate employment for such
a multitude, the resolution permitted enough nonresidential construc-
tion to support a workforce of an astronomical three hundred twenty
million.38
In 1961, the city adopted a new Zoning Resolution. The Resolu-
34. DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, NEW DWELLING UNITS COMPLETED 1978-
1980 24 (1982).
35. Id
36. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 200-1.0 (1976).
37. HARRISON, BALLARD & ALLEN, PLAN FOR REZONING THE CITY OF NEW
YORK XV (Report for the City Planning Commission, 1950).
38. Id.
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tion substantially reduced the total amount of residential develop-
ment permitted. In place of an upper limit of seventy million, the
new zoning regulations capped the potential residential population at
eleven million.39 The authors of the Zoning Resolution estimated
that by 1975, the city's population would grow to 8,585,000 people,
requiring an estimated 2,854,000 housing units.4 The new zoning
regulations allowed a total of 3,595,000 housing units.41
The new requirements lowered property values by reducing per-
mitted density. The city, therefore, gave property owners a grace pe-
riod of two years after the adoption of the Zoning Resolution to
complete foundations of buildings under the old zoning regulations.
If the foundations were timely, the city extended another two-year
grace period to complete the development without having to comply
with the new, more stringent zoning regulations.4
2
Developers of new housing obviously paid close attention to the
implications of the new zoning regulations.43 During the four-year
grace period, developers completed 208,000 housing units, thirty-four
percent more than in any other four-year period since 1929.4 4 Subse-
quently, housing production plummeted, dropping to an annual rate
of 32,000 in 1966, 23,000 in 1967, 17,000 in 1968 and 1969, and 14,000
in 1970. This decline is especially striking when viewed in compari-
son with housing production nationally, which remained constant
during this period.4n
While it was reasonable for the city to reduce its buildable density
39. VORHEES, WALKER, SMITH & SMITH, ZONING NEW YORK CITY FOR THE
CITY PLANNING COMMISSION vii (Report 1958).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. NEW YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION §§ 11-30 to -324 (1961). Norman
Marcus suggested that, as a practical matter, the city should permit virtually all build-
ings that met the foundation test to complete construction under the former zoning
resolution.
43. In 1960 and 1961 developers completed approximately 35,000 housing units
annually. In the first year of the grace period, 47,000 units were finished. In 1963, the
year by which foundations had to be completed, 60,000 units were finished. In the
last two years of the grace period, 1964 and 1965, developers completed 52,000 and
49,000 units respectively. DEPAR-IMENT OF CITY PLANNING, supra note 34, at 24.
44. Id.
45. According to the January 1981 ECONOMic REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, total
U.S. housing production stood at 1,509,700 units in 1965 and 1,469,000 units in 1970.
Private housing construction stood at 1,239,800 units in 1965 and 1,351,500 units in
1970
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to a manageable level, such an extensive "downzoning" was unneces-
sary. Although the theoretical population that the 1916 zoning regu-
lations permitted was astronomical, simple lack of demand for this
much housing precluded the construction of more than a fraction of
it. Yet, with the new Zoning Resolution permitting a population of
eleven million people, why did housing production fall so
precipitously?
To answer this question, it is necessary to examine two typical one
hundred by one hundred foot building sites: one in the southern part
of Brooklyn, the other in northern Brooklyn. During the grace pe-
riod, developers built many six-story apartment buildings on these
sites. Under the 1916 zoning laws, it was possible to build a six-story
building without having to set it back from the street. A six-story
building could have had 33,000 square feet of floor area. If the mar-
ket was strong enough, additional floors were set back one foot from
the street for every one and a half feet in additional height.
Under the 1961 Zoning Resolution the southern site is in a district
zoned R4. In an R4 district, the total allowable floor area may not
exceed seventy-five percent of the area of the lot. Because the size of
this hypothetical lot is 10,000 square feet, only 7,500 square feet of
floor area could be built. Therefore, the amount of floor area likely
to be built had declined by seventy-seven percent compared to the
old zoning regulations. This so altered the economics of develop-
ment that many projects were no longer practical.
The northern site is zoned R6 which permits a theoretical maxi-
mum floor area ratio of 2.43 times the size of the lot or 24,300 square
feet of floor area. In order to encourage developers to provide open
space in a congested city, however, the zoning permits the maximum
floor area to be achieved only in a thirteen story high-rise covering
nineteen percent of the site. Unfortunately, a thirteen story building
with 1,900 square feet per floor is a very inefficient building to con-
struct and operate. None were built. Although not irrational, the
drafters of the 1961 Zoning Resolution worked at a time when large
scale urban renewal programs made the assemblage of large sites, on
which apartment houses could be built, more practical. Some apart-
ment houses were built on substantially larger sites, however, most
R6 development has been two and three family row houses.
At least a portion of the post-1965 drop in housing production is
also attributable to the relative abundance of vacant apartments.
Following the surge in construction associated with the grace period,
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New York City experienced its highest post-war vacancy rates in
1965-3.19 percent.46 While low by national standards, this vacancy
rate stimulated "give-aways" to entice people to rent the new apart-
ments and discouraged new housing production until the surplus was
absorbed.
B. Vacant Land and Housing Programs
The 1961 Zoning Resolution was not the only restriction on the
development of new housing. From its inception, New York City has
expanded outward. Once a small Dutch village at the tip of Manhat-
tan Island, the settlement grew in population as it gobbled up farm-
land and outlying villages. Bridges and subways brought more and
more outlying land within the domain of the expanding metropolis.
The 1898 consolidation of New York City with the surrounding com-
munities enabled most expansion to occur within the confines of the
municipality. As a result, while Manhattan's population showed a
net decrease of 152,000 people between 1900 and 1960, the combined
populations of the other four boroughs increased by 4,497,000. 4 1
With the exception of Staten Island, which has no subway connec-
tion to Manhattan and was not connected to Brooklyn by bridge until
1964, few substantial tracts of undeveloped land were left in New
York City by the 1960s. This was particularly true in Manhattan.
"The spirit of pulling down and building up"'48 has been the tradi-
tional Manhattan response to the lack of sufficient vacant land.
While it is attractive economically to tear down an old, low-density
mansion or several brownstones to create a buildable site, it is far
more difficult to demolish high-rise or mid-rise developments. With
each successive wave of construction, the number of potentially
buildable sites decreased.
Confronted with the difficulty of producing housing in the central
city (which, though not peculiar to New York, was perhaps greater
because of the intensity of the earlier development) government
stepped in to assist. In the name of slum clearance and keeping the
middle class in the city, public agencies developed large areas of New
York City, beginning in the 1950s, as middle-income housing; some
46. M. STEGMAN, THE DYNAMICS OF RENTAL HOUSING IN NEW YORK CITY 93
(1982).
47. N. WHITE & E. WILLENSKY, supra note 14, at 576-77.
48. See C. LOCKWOOD, MANHATTAN MOVES UPTOWN 13 (1976) (quoting state-
ment Phillip Hone made in 1839).
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projects initiated then continue to this day. Nevertheless, by the late
1960s and early 1970s, these programs were discredited and no longer
active. These programs succumbed to accusations that urban re-
newal was black removal or that housing projects were replacing vi-
brant neighborhoods that would become the sterile slums of the
future.49
C. Household Formation
While building new housing for the middle class became more dif-
ficult, changes in lifestyles increased the demand for housing. Be-
tween 1950 and 1970 New York City's population essentially
remained constant."0 Nevertheless, the number of households in-
creased 5' because of a drop in average household size.52 These
trends were most acute in Manhattan where by 1980 average house-
hold size fell to 1.96 persons, the lowest for any county in the United
States, with the exception of Kalawao County in Hawaii, a leper
colony. 3
D. Race
While New York's overall housing market was tightening consid-
erably, racial attitudes exacerbated an already bad situation. Racial
prejudice, although rarely acknowledged, is certainly one of the most
important considerations in determining where people, particularly
the white middle and upper-middle class, choose to live.
Between 1940 and 1970, as more blacks arrived in New York, the
boundaries of the "ghetto" expanded and whites "fled." White
neighborhoods, such as the Brooklyn neighborhoods of Crown
Heights, Bushwick, East New York, Brownsville, East Flatbush, and
Flatbush, became black.54 The middle-income housing market
shunned enormous areas of central Brooklyn, northern Manhattan,
49. See generaloJ. JACOBS, THE LIFE AND DEATH OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES
(1961).
50. U.S. Census of Population, 1950 and 1970.
51. Households increased from 2,433,000 to 2,805,000. 2 I. LOWRY, J. DE SALVO
& B. WOODFILL, RENTAL HOUSING IN NEW YORK CITY 21 (1971).
52. Average household size declined from 3.15 to 2.73 persons. In Manhattan,
average household size dropped to 2.17 in 1970 from 2.8 in 1950. Id.
53. U.S. Census of Housing, 1980.
54. Whites also fled from the heavy influx of Hispanics during the post-World
War II period.
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the southern Bronx, and central and southern Queens. Most of the
whites remaining in these neighborhoods lacked the economic option
to leave.
"White flight" exacerbated the demand for middle class housing
elsewhere in the city. The exodus to the suburbs relieved some of this
demand, but two areas within the city came under heavy housing
pressure. One was the outer rim of the city beyond the expanding
black and Hispanic neighborhoods. The other was the core itself,
consisting of most of Manhattan south of 96th Street. Located within
the core, Manhattan's loft neighborhoods became the "beneficiary"
of white housing preferences.
E. The Attraction of Manhattan
When the baby-boom generation came to the age of household for-
mation by the mid-1960s, the need for dwelling units increased.55
Although their parents had opted for less urban locations in bor-
oughs other than Manhattan, or in the suburbs, or in the equivalent
locations in other metropolitan areas, a significant portion of these
young households looked to the central core as a place to live.
Manhattan emerged as the place where young professionals could
live with others of similar interests while theoretically having the
city's ethnic diversity56 at their doorstep. Unlike the suburbs, which
they consider stodgy,57 the young professionals are attracted to Man-
hattan as a place of "ideas."58 In addition, New York's emergence as
a "world city"5 9 also has attracted foreigners and out-of-towners.6°
New York's press dubbed the city "magical,",6' though it recognized
that at least a part of this magic includes high rent levels.
The arrival of these affluent people led to the development of chic
boutiques and restaurants to cater to their needs and, more impor-
tantly, their whims. As more stores open in a place like SoHo the
neighborhood becomes desirable to many people who previously
55. I. LOWRY, J. DE SALVO & B. WOODFILL, supra note 51, at 2.
56. Fleetwood, The New Elite and the Urban Renaissance, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14,
1979, § 6 (Magazine), at 35. Needless to say, the ever-increasing presence of young
professionals is destroying the same ethnic diversity.
57. Id at 22.
58. Id. at 21.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. New York Daily News, Oct. 28, 1980, at M2, col. 1.
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would not have tolerated the disadvantages of urban life-high crime
relative to the suburbs, a deteriorating subway system as compared to
the comforts of one's own car, and the inconvenience of living in a
nonresidential neighborhood without a supermarket or dry cleaner.
The newcomers bring still more boutiques and restaurants, which in
turn attract more residents, tourists, and writers to further report the
marvels of Manhattan.
Manhattan has not been the only beneficiary of people's desire to
live in the core. Priced out of Manhattan, many young professionals
have sought and found a compromise alternative near the fringe of
the expanding core in areas such as brownstone neighborhoods in
Brooklyn, and also in Jersey City and Hoboken, New Jersey. 62 Be-
cause of the distance of these neighborhoods from the core, however,
their less cosmopolitan character as compared to Manhattan and
their proximity to minority communities, these alternatives are not
expanding fast enough to meet the demand for upper-income
housing.
63
To "real Manhattanites,"' it makes sense to live in a tiny studio
apartment in Greenwich Village even though the rent for that apart-
ment is higher than the cost of a six-room apartment with a garden in
a fringe area. Saul Steinberg portrayed it best without words in his
classic illustration for the cover of The New Yorker, showing a view
of the United States that consists mostly of Manhattan, with the rest
of the nation, and the world beyond, barely visible as distant bumps
in the horizon beyond the Hudson River.
F. Rent Regulation
A final often-cited factor in the housing squeeze is New York's sys-
tem of rent regulation, which some claim has depressed construction
of new housing and provided a disincentive to the upkeep of existing
buildings.65 They also assert that rent regulation has discouraged oc-
62. Brown, Heaven, Hell... or Hoboken, METROPOLIS, June 1982, at 12-15.
63. The law of supply and demand dictates that prices rise -vhen supply becomes
inadequate to meet demand. If gentrification of peripheral areas occurred fast
enough, price rises would slow both in the core and in peripheral areas; this is not the
case in New York City.
64. Quindlen, Exquisite Agony of Living in Manhattan, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1982,
§ 8, at 7.
65. See THE REAL ESTATE BOARD OF NEW YORK, TROUBLE AT HOME 3 (1983);
THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON HOUSING 91-94 (1982).
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cupants of rent-regulated apartments from moving, thus reducing the
supply of available conventional housing, which pushes those seeking
residential space towards lofts. It is not our intention to evaluate the
merits of rent regulation. Instead, our thesis is that rent regulation, at
most, has had only a modest impact on the loft market. The primary
causes of loft demand-the dramatic drop in post-1965 housing pro-
duction and the increasing demand for housing within the core-
were not altered significantly by rent regulation.
IV. ARGUMENTS FOR UNRESTRICTED CONVERSION
Against this history of industrial abandonment and pressure for
housing, proponents and opponents of loft housing have debated in-
dustry's future in the city. The proponents contend that central city
industrial use has little or no future. Pointing to the dramatic de-
crease in industrial employment, they argue that manufacturing lo-
cated in multi-story lofts is unable to compete with suburban
locations. Depending on which of the housing proponents was
speaking, manufacturers either: 1) No longer want space in old
multi-story loft buildings;66 2) no longer want space in smaller loft
buildings;67 3) or no longer desire to remain in Manhattan, New
York City, the Northeast, or the United States.68
To support their claims, housing proponents point to the delays
caused by Manhattan's generally intolerable level of traffic conges-
tion, delays caused by multiple users sharing old and often inade-
quate elevators, the meager distances (by today's standards) between
columns in lofts that prohibit the use of large modern equipment, and
the difficulty of operating a business on multiple floors, both in terms
of the constant movement of goods and the burden of supervising
employees.69 Additionally, they argue that New York is an inhospi-
66. Testimony of Earl Altman before the New York City Board of Standards and
Appeals on the application for a variance to permit the residential conversion of 1
Dominick Street, Manhattan (BSA Cal. No. 1170-79BZ).
67. E. POTTER, RESIDENTIAL USE OF MANHATTAN LOFT BUILDINGS: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Report of the Real Estate Board of New York, 1975) (rec-
ommended allowing the conversion of the upper floors of all loft buildings with floors
of less than 7,500 square feet).
68. Smith, Info City, NEW YORK, Feb. 9, 1981, at 25.
69. Tobier, Gentrocation: The Manhattan Story, 5 NEW YORK AFFAIRS 24 (1979).
The argument that loft buildings were obsolete did not originate with the loft conver-
sion movement. In 1962, the City Club criticized the Planning Commission for its
reluctance to recommend the demolition of obsolete commercial slums, now known
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table place for manufacturing because of high taxes and utility rates.
Each of these claims has some merit.
The housing proponents are not prophets of doom. In place of
manufacturing they envision a white-collar and service economy.
Their alternative was best expressed in an article suggesting that New
York City would thrive as the communications and information
center of the western world and blatantly advising New Yorkers to
"forget manufacturing."7 As Manhattan's office and service econ-
omy grew rapidly in the late 1970s, gaining 210,000 jobs7' between
1977 and 1981, housing proponents urged City Hall to give loft con-
version its unconditional blessing as a means to provide the biggest
housing bargains in the city72 so that the office workers would have a
place to live when they moved back to the city.73 Not only would loft
conversion provide the city with additional housing but the develop-
ment would increase tax revenues paid to the city. Furthermore, the
residences would help make New York a viable community because
they would offer a strong alternative to the suburban movement, by
providing a central location to the city's many and varied activities.
Residential tenants would create increased street activity during eve-
ning hours and on weekends that would contribute to safer streets. 74
Underlying this position was the faith its advocates have in the free
market. If manufacturing is no longer the highest and best use for
land in midtown Manhattan, it should give way to economically
as SoHo. At that time, the United Hatters, Cap, and Millinery Workers Union sup-
ported the demolition of SoHo to make way for housing for its members. In 1962,
however, they still expected urban renewal funds to subsidize more modem facilities.
See Zukosky, The Urban Renewal Battle over Manhattan's "Valley," N.Y. Herald
Tribune, Dec. 9, 1962.
70. Smith, supra note 68, at 24-29.
71. Speech delivered by S. Ehrenhalt at the Fifteenth Annual Institute on the
Challenges of the Changing Economy of New York City (Apr. 28, 1982) (discussing
the New York City labor market).
72. Horsley, A Pushfor a Residential Midtown, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1976, § 8, at
4. At the time, an unfinished "raw" loft sold for about $12.50 per square foot with an
estimated additional cost of $2.50 per square foot to "finish" the space. Two years
later, in a market in which illegal conversion proliferated, a similar loft sold for $30
per square foot. By 1980, before any city attempt to regulate conversion, "finished"
lofts were selling for $100 per square foot.
73. Fleetwood, supra note 56, at 35.
74. Statement by S. Lobel in support of an application at the Board of Standards
and Appeals for a variance to permit the residential conversion of I Dominick Street
(BSA Cal. No. 1170-79BZ). These sentiments were expressed widely in many vari-
ance applications, newspaper articles, and public discussions.
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stronger activities. According to this view, government involvement
interfered with the functioning of the marketplace, except when it
benefited conversion in programs such as the city's generous J-51 tax
subsidy. Until 1980 this subsidy permitted residential developers to
abate property taxes equal to ninety percent of the "certified reason-
able" cost of converting the amount they put into renovating the
building.75
V. THE NEED TO REGULATE CONVERSION
Despite these arguments, industrial use of space in New York,
although down, is certainly not out. Following the city's industrial
decline in the early 1970s, the loss of manufacturing slowed signifi-
cantly, dropping only 3.5 percent of the 1947 employment total be-
tween 1975 and 1980. In 1980 manufacturing accounted for 499,000
jobs in New York City, 276,400 of them in Manhattan.
Although modern production and distribution methods work opti-
mally in single story operations with superior vehicular access-a
type rarely available within the central business district-the nature
of most industrial firms remaining in Manhattan made relocating
elsewhere unattractive.
The city's largest industry is comprised of the "needle trades,"
which produce and market clothing and related items such as pocket-
books and leather goods. Small firms, averaging less than fifty em-
ployees, dominate the industry.76 These firms generally are
undercapitalized and, therefore, prefer to rent rather than own their
space. Because of their lack of capital, they also are limited in the
amount of goods or equipment they can maintain. As a result, they
frequently cluster together to realize the advantages of linkages with
other firms. Within a few blocks they can purchase almost anything
they need on very short notice.7 7 In general, the trend in this indus-
try has been away from production and shipping within the central
business district and towards use of such space for selling products.7 8
Although loft buildings do not offer the advantages of modern one-
75. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § J51-2.5(b)(2) (Supp. 1980-81). The manu-
facturers also have professed a belief in the free market, except when they were losing
the fight for loft space.
76. Interview with Lance Michaels, Senior Planner, New York Department of
City Planning (an expert on the garment industry).
77. L. Kahn, supra note 12, at 21.
78. DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, supra note 11, at 63.
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story structures, the needle trades operate comparatively well in the
old buildings. Much of Manhattan's stock of loft buildings was built
specifically for use by needle trades firms,79 and production methods
have changed little since these buildings were built.8 0
The central location of Manhattan's loft buildings and the accessi-
bility of the subway permit firms located there to draw employees
from working-class neighborhoods throughout the city. One large
and expanding segment of the needle trades work force is Chinese-
American. These parts of the garment industry must be within walk-
ing distance of Chinatown to permit access to sufficient Chinese la-
bor."' Owners of these companies have little choice but to tolerate
the inconveniences of loft buildings.
Marketing is tied even more closely to the use of multiple floor
buildings for showrooms and offices. Individual buildings function
as merchandise marts for particular types of products,82 permitting
out-of-town buyers to shop from firm to firm within one building or
within a cluster of buildings. Because of manufacturers' reliance on
out-of-town buyers,8 3 showrooms need nearby services to accomo-
date them, such as hotels, restaurants, and entertainment.
The second major industry in Manhattan is commercial printing,
which services the financial, advertising, and corporate headquarters
in New York City. Unlike needle trades firms, many printing estab-
lishments, particularly the larger operations, use large equipment that
can make many loft buildings impracticable.84 Coupled with high
energy costs, taxes, technological improvements, and a dispersion of
79. L. Kahn, supra note 12, at 23.
80. It is not difficult to fit several sewing machines between columns spaced
twenty feet apart. Because most of the firms are small, they are not troubled by the
problems of supervising workers on multiple floors.
81. Because of language barriers and social customs such as school children going
to lunch with their mothers at factories, many Chinese workers will not work at great
distances from their homes.
82. Michaels, supra note 76.
83. New York City accounted for 51.6% of all wholesale apparel sold in the
United States in 1977.
84. A modem web press, together with room for loading and unloading paper,
can require an undivided space 100 feet long and at least 20 feet wide. Robert Hort,
Chairman of the Board of Enterprise Press, Inc., mentioned this fact in public state-
ments and in a letter to Community Board 2 in support of Enterprise's request for a
variance to convert their building at 627 Greenwich Street (May 8, 1981). Enterprise
wished to finance their relocation to larger quarters by selling their loft building for a
residential conversion (BSA Cal. No. 182-81BZ).
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their corporate clients, one-story locations outside of Manhattan fre-
quently have become attractive alternatives.
Nevertheless, several factors cause printers to remain in Manhat-
tan.85 Although most loft buildings are inadequate for their needs,
some of the buildings erected in the 1920s and 1930s were built spe-
cifically for use by printers. The floors can handle the heavy loads
demanded by printers, and the buildings often have off-street loading
facilities and large elevators that reduce delivery problems. These
buildings also have large floor sizes permitting many printers to oper-
ate on one floor.
More significantly, printers have remained in Manhattan for rea-
sons relating to marketing, in addition to the advantages of speciali-
zation gained by the clustering of many printing firms. Because of
the need for clients to review the material that the printer prepares, it
has been important to be close enough to allow the client easy ac-
cess.86 Improvements in electronic communication technology may
reduce this linkage, but the advantages of clustering are not likely to
diminish. By choosing a Manhattan location where thirteen percent
of the nation's printing trade services are nearby, 87 printers can re-
duce their overhead yet continue to provide their clients with the
broadest range of services.
A third industry for which a Manhattan location has remained
suitable is wholesale meat. This industry is concentrated in several
compact markets in New York City. The most important is the Gan-
sevoort-14th Street Meat Market in Manhattan.88 In this market,
which includes many hotels, restaurants, and institutions, linkages
between firms are crucial to their efficient operation.89 Generally,
only the first floor is used for cutting, processing, and storing meat,
thus eliminating the problems of multiple floors. Numerous propos-
als to relocate the market have faltered, primarily because of opposi-
85. DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, supra note 11, at 99. Two-thirds of all
New York City employment in printing and related trade services is within the Man-
hattan central business district. In 1979, these trades provided 27,000 jobs in
Manhattan.
86. M. Mammano, A. Pizzicara & M. Kessler, Loft Conversion: A New Policy
Approach for SoHo-NoHo 5-6 (interdepartmental memorandum, Department of City
Planning, 1975).
87. DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, supra note 11, at 95, 102.
88. A. STEIN, NEw YORK COUNTY OVERALL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PRO-
GRAM 1979/1980 106 (1979).
89. Id.
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tion from market firms. Rather than move, meat market firms have
invested millions of dollars to make their facilities comply with code
and statutory requirements. 90
Activity by individual users who remain continues to be very im-
portant for the city's economic health. Blue-collar employment is
one of the best sources of jobs for the city's substantial population of
semi-skilled and unskilled workers. 91 While the service and office
sectors of the city's economy grew dramatically in the late 1970s, off-
setting the slower loss in manufacturing jobs, New York City resi-
dents accounted for as little as 5.9 percent of the net increase in
employment.92 The rapid loss of significant portions of the remain-
ing industrial economy almost certainly would result in an increase in
the already substantial number of unemployed, and unemployable,
New York City residents.
As the demand for public assistance increases, taxes also increase.
Higher taxes can only mean that more businesses will leave the city93
creating still more unemployment and higher taxes. Although people
without jobs eventually may migrate to areas where employment is
plentiful (assuming such areas exist), these migrations take place over
an extended period of time.94 In the interim, it is the "safety net"
paid out of the public treasury that sustains people. Although new
economic activity is being generated in the central city-through a
growing office and service sector, expanded housing for the upper
classes, and the increased retail activity they stimulate-the revenue
generated is insufficient to offset the drain from the municipal till
caused by increased demand for public assistance.
What then is the economic effect of conversion on New York City?
In 1977, the Center for Urban Policy Research (CURR) examined
90. NEW YORK CITY PLANNING COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 40. Much of the
money was invested to meet the requirements of the Wholesale Meat Act that Con-
gress passed in 1967. To ensure reliable refrigeration, many of the meat market firms
coordinated efforts to install a new refrigeration plant.
91. NEw YORK CITY PLANNING COMMISSION, PLANNING FOR JOBS 40 (1971).
92. Prial, Manhattan in Change.- The Future of the Economy, N.Y. Times, July 14,
1982, at B, col. 1. More recent estimates range as high as one-third of the net increase.
93. As one of the nation's most highly-taxed localities, New York City has exper-
ienced firsthand the business community's expression of its dissatisfaction: departure.
See Kenneth T. Laub & Co., Inc., Survey on Corporate Location (1980) (found per-
sonal, not business taxes, a major factor in a business' decision to leave New York).
94. New York City's unemployment rate, which rose along with the city's job
losses in the early 1970s, has not recovered despite a 10.9% drop in population.
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the present value of the net gain or loss in municipal revenue from
conversion,95 which did not include any costs resulting from dis-
placed manufacturing activity (summarized in the Table 1, Part A).
The Center calculated the 1977 present value of the net loss over
twenty-five years from the conversion of one dwelling unit at almost
$6,000. By far the major factor in this loss was almost $8,000 in taxes
foregone through the city's J-51 tax abatement and exemption pro-
gram. As it applied to conversion in 1976, the J-51 program provided
a twelve-year exemption against any increase in assessed value result-
ing from the conversion. It also provided an abatement of existing
taxes in an amount equal to ninety percent of the reasonable cost of
the conversion. As a rule, in 1976, conversions with J-51 were ex-
cused from paying any real estate taxes for a period of twelve to
twenty years.
Even if the city had eliminated this tax subsidy program, the 1977
present value of the gain to the municipal treasury would barely ex-
ceed $2,000 per dwelling unit. This would not have offset the loss of
commercial occupancy taxes, business taxes, taxes paid by employees
of the manufacturing concerns displaced by conversion, and the mul-
tiplier effects of money circulating in the economy spent by a busi-
ness and its employees.
If manufacturing displaced by conversion does not relocate in New
York, the economic loss is great, because the residential user does not
make up for the departure of the industrial user. A 1976 study96
concluded that each manufacturing employee generated $1,395 annu-
ally in municipal revenue without considering multiplier effects
(summarized in the Table 1, Part B). Applying the CUPR's discount
rate, the 1976 present value of the lost revenue is approximately
$15,000 per manufacturing employee over twenty-five years. Assum-
ing a net ratio of total municipal revenues to total municipal costs for
industrial use of 2.6:19' the net municipal gain from manufacturing is
approximately $9,200 per employee. Without the J-51 tax abatement
program, the 1977 present value of the net loss to the city from the
creation of one residential unit that displaced manufacturing is ap-
proximately $25,500 to $34,700. At the rate of job loss from conver-
95. K. FORD, supra note 27.
96. NEW YORK TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON CITY FINANCE, THE EFFECTS OF
TAXATION ON MANUFACTURING IN NEW YORK CITY 36 (1976).
97. See R. RODDEWIG, LOFT CONVERSIONS: PLANNING ISSUES, PROBLEMS AND
PROSPECTS 17 (1981).
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sion between 1978 and 1980 of fourteen percent, 98 the average unit
that conversion created cost the city between $1,873 and $3,156.
Since 1980, the likelihood of a displaced firm relocating within the
city has diminished as the amount of vacant loft space has decreased.
Even this analysis underestimates the costs of displacing manufac-
turers for residential conversion. While the early conversions were
concentrated in the older lower Manhattan neighborhoods previously
occupied by the more marginal industrial uses, by the late 1970s con-
version occurred in almost all loft areas, including those occupied by
closely linked, relatively healthy segments of the industrial sector. In
disrupting the linkages between firms, these conversions threaten to
undermine one of the most important reasons for industry to remain
in New York. Usually this happens slowly, shrinking the size of the
cluster one firm at a time. Occasionally, it is more dramatic, such as
when an illegal loft conversion threatened one of the city's three fur
shearers with displacement. 99 If this conversion had displaced the
shearer, the city's fur industry would have been seriously
compromised.
The protection of the city's remaining industrial loft tenants is im-
perative. This protection, however, need not come at the expense of
housing. In the 1960s approximately fifty-eight thousand units of
market-rate housing were constructed in Manhattan. In the 1970s the
construction of new market-rate housing declined dramatically to ap-
proximately twenty thousand units."° As new construction declined
m the mid-to-late 1960s, the affluent sought new ways of satisfying
their desire for central-city housing. Their solution was to renovate
existing housing or loft buildings. The Department of City Planning
estimated01' that the number of market-rate housing units that the
affluent created totaled approximately forty-five thousand during the
1970s, bringing the number of market-rate units produced in the
1970s up to virtually the same level produced in the 1960s.
Just as millions of people moved from the city to the countryside,
transforming it into suburbia, the increasing popularity of lofts has
resulted in their becoming more expensive, smaller, and more like
98. See supra note 23.
99. The city sued to stop the illegal conversion at 151 West 28 Street, Manhattan.
City of New York v. Groff Studios, Index No. 42080/79 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 19, 1980)
(unpublished opinion).
100. DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, supra note 11, at 207.
101. Id. at 215.
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apartments. Indeed, housing now being produced in lofts is not very
different from that which new construction can produce-and it is
sold at similar prices.
The question that must be asked is whether increasing the level of
new construction, both in Manhattan and in other boroughs that can
attract Manhattan-oriented households, would dampen the demand
for converted lofts while satisfying the need for new market-rate
housing. The answer appears to be affirmative.
As a group, loft residents are not conspicuously different from the
people that constitute the gentrifying population of central cities
across the United States, as seen by comparing a 1977 study of loft
TABLE 1
Present Value Analysis of Municipal Revenue and Costs
Resulting from Residential Conversion of
Manufacturing Lofts (1976-77)
PART A Gain or Loss to New York City from Conversion with and without J-51
I Taxes foregone through J-51 ($7,947)
2 Taxes produced through construction spending and fees 580
3. Sales and income taxes created by residents induced to 789
live in New York City attributable to lofts
4 Tax revenues created by multiplier effects of #2 and #3 1,951
5, Per household cost of common municipal services for ($1,344)
residents induced to live in New York City attributable to
lofts
6 Net loss per unit from conversion with J-51 ($5,971)
7 Net gain per unit from conversion without J-51 $1,976
PART B Gain or Loss to New York City from Displaced Manufacturing
8 Municipal revenue per manufacturing worker $14,891
9 Municipal expenses per manufacturing worker at a ratio ($5,727)
of municipal revenue to cost of 2.6:1
10 Net municipal revenue per manufacturing worker $9,164
11 Number of manufacturing workers per 1,200 sq. ft. 3-4
(typical size of a residential loft)
12 Potential net loss from displaced manufacturing per 1,200 ($27,492-36,656)
sq. ft. unit
13 Potential net loss from displaced manufacturing per 1,200 ($25,516-34,680)
sq. ft. unit, including gain from conversion in #7
14. Net average loss per converted unit assuming 14 percent ($1,873-3,156)
of jobs leave New York City, inclucing gain from
conversion in #7
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residents °2 with studies examining gentrifying neighborhoods in
seven American cities. °3 In the cities for which income data were
available, incomes consistently were considerably above the 1975 na-
tional median of $14,900 per household. The populations were gen-
erally young, with usually half or more between twenty-five and
thirty-four years of age, with about eighty percent below forty-four.
At a time when only 14.7 percent of the United States population had
completed a four-year college degree program, between sixty-two
and ninety-seven percent of the gentrifiers were college graduates.
Among loft residents, median income was $22,783. Among resi-
dents of illegally-converted lofts, allegedly unable to afford the costs
of code compliance, median income stood at $19 ,390.1° Loft resi-
dents were also young and well-educated: 81.6 percent were between
twenty and thirty-nine years of age and 74.2 percent had completed
four or more years of college.
Because loft dwellers did not differ significantly from other gen-
trifiers, one may conclude that their housing preferences were also
similar. When asked, 105 only 7.7 percent of loft dwellers responded
that they would not live in the city if their loft or a similar unit was
unavailable.
VI. THE RESPONSE TO THE PROBLEMS OF CONVERSION
Despite the clear need for sound control of loft conversion, munici-
pal and state officials have only recently abandoned the belief that
residential conversion is inherently good. Until 1977, city and state
officials lacked any comprehension of the widespread illegal nature
of the loft movement and its negative impact on the city's economy.
By the end of 1978, three major events occurred. The first was a
report issued in December 1977 by the Department of City Plan-
ning 1 6 indicating that 1,023 (23.5 percent) of the 4,354 loft buildings
102. K. FORD, supra note 27, at 1-51.
103. Gale, Middle Class Resettlement in Older Urban Neighborhoods, 45 J. AM.
PLAN. ASS'N 293-304 (July 1979).
104. This number may be inflated. Occupants of illegal conversion with lower
socio-economic characteristics may have been less likely to have responded to the
survey.
105. K. FORD, supra note 27, at 1-5 1.
106. DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, RESIDENTIAL RE-USE OF NON-RESIDEN-
TIAL BUILDINGS IN MANHATTAN 22-24 (1977).
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in Manhattan's loft neighborhoods were wholly or partially (three or
more units) converted to residential use, and that 936 of these (91.5
percent) were illegal conversions. Moreover, this illegal conversion
activity was not concentrated in a few locations but scattered
throughout Manhattan south of 59th Street.
The second event occurred in the spring of 1978 during state and
local hearings on continuation of the state enabling legislation for the
J-51 tax abatement program. Manufacturers and labor unions spoke
out against the program and blamed it for the loss of jobs. In order
to salvage the legislation, Mayor Edward Koch established an inter-
agency Task Force on Loft Conversion to make city and state policy
recommendations concerning loft conversions.
The third event was a recommendation by the Task Force to have
the Department of Buildings inspect the illegal buildings identified in
the City Planning report. Once city officials realized the magnitude
of illegal conversions, it became clear that a major fire or structural
calamity could occur. Therefore, in the spring of 1978, building in-
spectors inspected these buildings and cited those not in compliance
with the zoning and building codes.
Like Rip Van Winkle, loft owners awoke. Some ignored the viola-
tions and others used them to threaten their tenants with rent in-
creases. Other loft owners petitioned the city to leave them alone
claiming that they and their tenants were doing fine until the city
stepped in.
Owners and tenants, however, were not doing fine. Many residen-
tial loft tenants faced steep rent increases and eviction. They had
begun to fight back on an individual basis by going to the courts.
Catalyzed by the 1978 inspections, illegal loft tenants formed organi-
zations to address their problems. 107 By necessity, the tenants identi-
fied with the beleaguered manufacturer because both were being
displaced from their lofts.
While residential loft tenants formerly had preferred freedom of
choice to zoning and building code restrictions, they now turned to
the restrictive hand of government for help. Composed of a young,
educated population, schooled in an era of social and anti-war pro-
test and with access to the media and affluent patrons, the arts com-
munity and other "pioneer" loft tenants chose to fight.
107. These organizations were Lower Manhattan Loft Tenants, Chelsea Loft
Dwellers Association (which later merged into Lower Manhattan Loft Tenants), and
Brooklyn Loft Tenants.
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Credited with originating the loft movement, artists accounted for
24.3 percent of the heads of households residing in converted build-
ings in 1977.1° Of those in illegally-converted lofts, artists accounted
for 44.9 percent. By comparison, in 1970 only 2.1 percent of New
York City heads of households were classified as artists. As a group,
the artists have come to see their status in New York in terms of their
ability to acquire or keep their lofts. The claim that artists "need"
lofts remains unsubstantiated. Artists and their patrons, however, be-
lieve it and the media report it. 09
Artists have argued that the arts are a multibillion dollar industry
in New York City that will be seriously compromised if the artists
lost their lofts. The galleries, which they claim depend on their art,
will disappear. Other cities quickly will attract what New York will
lose.
This argument has some merit. Just as New York grew in impor-
tance in the art world when Paris waned, other cities, including Paris,
can gain if New York declines. Loft conversion is not a phenomenon
peculiar to New York, and if artists and lofts go hand in hand other
cities may offer artists something New York can not-large amounts
of centrally-located space at an affordable price. A number of cities
have explored promoting artists' housing and cooperatives; they are
not unique to New York."'
Others have made claims upon the city. The generation of nonar-
tist pioneers that helped the artists create residential communities
now find that their combined success has produced a housing market
where none previously existed. While this is desirable if one owns a
loft in a cooperative, residents, artists and nonartists alike, are usually
renters. When loft cooperative prices rose eightfold between 1976
and 1980,1 old-time renters found themselves priced out. Identify-
ing and allying themselves closely with artists, they have proved to be
potent political and legal adversaries of real estate owners and
developers.
New York's liberal political establishment was quick to identify
108. K. FORD, supra note 27, at 21.
109. Glueck, Neighborhoods: SoHo is Artists' Last Resort, N.Y. Times, May 11,
1970, at 37, col. 1. The number of newspaper articles, magazine articles, television
reports, and radio reports that adopted this position is staggering.
110. Project Arts in San Francisco is an example.
111. Horsley, supra note 72, at 4.
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first with the need for artist housing1 12 and later with the protection
of all early loft dwellers." 3 Articulate, sophisticated, and able to
gain access to the media, the relatively small loft tenant population' 14
brought their grievances to the public's attention. They also were
fortunate to be represented by potent, liberal city and state legisla-
tors. In a city where most housing is rented, successive municipal
administrations have found it difficult to ignore the pleas of the loft
tenants without appearing insensitive.
In addition to using political strength, loft tenants have turned to
the courts. Relying on a substantial body of relatively protenant law
and generally sympathetic judges, loft tenants have won in court
some of the rights available to occupants of conventional housing. In
Lipkis v. Pikus,"5 one of the leading loft cases, the Civil Court of the
City of New York held that although both landlord and tenants had
participated in an illegal conversion and the tenants had signed com-
mercial leases, the conversion constituted a de facto multiple dwell-
ing and, therefore, the landlord was not entitled to receive rent until
the building was made code compliant.
Through litigation, 16 loft tenants fought landlords to a stalemate.
112. Clarity, Artist Plan Draws Laughs and Noes in Assembly, N.Y. Times, Feb.
20, 1968, at 76, col. 5.
113. Goldstein, Have I Got a Bargainfor You, Village Voice, Nov. 4, 1980, col. 1,
at 24, 25.
114. The Loft Board estimates that approximately 1,000 illegally-converted loft
buildings exist, or approximately 6,000 loft units. Assuming a typical Manhattan oc-
cupancy of 1.9 people per unit, illegal loft dwellers account for about 11,400 people,
less than 0.2% of the city's population.
115. 96 Misc. 2d 581, 409 N.Y.S.2d 598 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1978), affd in part and
modfied in part, 99 Misc. 2d 518, 416 N.Y.S.2d 694 (N.Y. App. Term), aft'd, 72
A.D.2d 697, 421 N.Y.S.2d 825 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979).
116. For background on loft litigation prior to the Loft Law, see Weisbrod, Loft
Conversion: Will Enforcement Bring Acceptance, 6 N.Y.AFFAIRS 52-53 (1981); Note,
An Evaluation of New York Conversion Law, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 511, 523-29
(1982). Before the Loft Law, the New York courts generally addressed four issues.
The first issue was residential occupancy. In general, courts held that a building con-
stituted a de facto multiple dwelling if it contained three or more units and the tenants
occupied the premises with the consent of the landlord, even if the building lacked a
residential certificate of occupancy.
The second issue was minimum safety standards. In the leading case of Lipkis v.
Pikus, the trial judge invoked the sanction of § 302(l)(b) of the State's Multiple
Dwelling Law, which barred the collection of rent in a multiple dwelling lacking a
residential certificate of occupancy. The Appellate Term, in an opinion adopted by
the Appellate Division, modified the trial court's use of § 302 and required the tenants
to pay rent into court until the owner obtained a residential certificate of occupancy.
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The prospect of thousands of loft tenants on rent strike provided a
powerful incentive to find a legislative solution. Otherwise, landlords
would have found themselves in the awkward position of trying to
recover rent by maintaining that they ran commercial buildings in
which these tenants lived illegally. The courts would have had to sort
out the conflicting claims on a case-by-case basis.
Equity provided another incentive. Loft tenants and owners made
their bargain with each other in the 1960s and early 1970s to their
mutual advantage. Landlords rented space that had very little value
in the marketplace. Tenants got a great deal of space in the heart of
one of the most crowded places in the world and they got it cheaply.
Whether the real estate market and the general population would
have discovered loft buildings without the presence of the artists,
other pioneers, and the glamorous image of it presented by the media
is unknown. Other urban neighborhoods throughout North America
and Europe are experiencing an influx of the affluent without the
presence of artists as a drawing card. On the other hand, at least in
New York-absent massive government intervention such as urban
renewal-gentrification begins slowly until enough individual pio-
neering households have moved in to create a sufficient "critical
mass" to attract the attention of the general populace." 7 Arguably,
the presence of artists at least accelerated the pace of gentrification in
Manhattan's loft neighborhoods.
While tenants and landlords initially had benefited equally from
their arrangement, with the expansion of the market, landlords bene-
fited at the expense of their earlier tenants. The tenants found this
For obvious reasons, owners did not obtain certificates of occupancy for illegally-
occupied buildings.
A third issue considered by the courts was rent regulation. In Mandel v. Plitkow-
sky, 102 Misc. 2d 478, 425 N.Y.S.2d 92 (N.Y. App. Term), a id, 76 A.D.2d 807, 429
N.Y.S.2d 550 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979), the court found that rent stabilization applied to
loft tenants.
The final issue that the courts considered prior to the Loft Law involved services.
In Corris v. 129 Front Co., 85 A.D.2d 176, 447 N.Y.S.2d 480 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982),
the court conditioned the provision of housing maintenance services upon the pay-
ment of rent. The few cases pertaining to the applicability of the warranty of habita-
bility to lofts do not give a clear interpretation of the warranty's applicability.
117. Thus, in 1977, A. Barkan of James Felt Realty described real estate in
Brooklyn's Park Slope section as "marginal property" in spite of a gentrification pro-
cess that had been underway for at least eight years. By 1981, Park Slope was no
longer marginal but, rather, "hot, trendy [and] affordable." NEw BROOKLYN MAGA-
ZINE, vol. 4, no. 2 (1981).
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unfair."' They vigorously pressed their argument with city and state
officials.
The government, however, was at odds with itself and unprepared
to act effectively. The state attorney general's office took the position
that the affluent people, involved in buying and selling spaces for ille-
gal conversions and pricing the pioneer tenants out of the loft market,
were not violating state law.
The protection of consumers is one of the attorney general's re-
sponsibilities. In terms of the public sale of real estate, this is accom-
plished by requiring the filing of an offering plan or prospectus with
the attorney general's office. The state's General Business Law re-
quires that every offering plan fully disclose all the facts that may
affect a potential purchaser's decision.' 9
The attorney general's office does not verify the accuracy of all
mandated material facts. It merely reviews the offering plan to make
certain that all the required categories of information are included. It
then accepts the offering plan for filing. An approval disclaimer ap-
pears on the front cover of a typical loft offering plan.' z° The pur-
pose of the offering plan is to inform the consumer about potential
pitfalls in the purchase of the offered property. Once warned, let the
118. This also can be viewed in the context of attitudes toward the wisdom of the
marketplace's invisible hand. When they illegally moved into lofts, loft tenants com-
plained that foolish government regulations impaired their freedom of choice. When
faced with the realization that the marketplace would take their lofts from them, they
turned to the government to restrict the freedom of property owners. At the same
time, however, loft tenants objected to the most minimal requirements, such as regis-
tering as a nonconforming use and artists' certification.
Artists also resisted other proposed solutions to their housing problems. Proposals
to attract artists to low-income neighborhoods were met with ridicule by artists. The
residents of these neighborhoods also opposed artists' housing, fearing that it was the
first step in the gentrification process.
Although artists voluntarily pursued careers in the arts, with the probability that
such a decision would result in a reduction in their income, artists did not believe they
should be poor. Often raised in middle-class homes and college educated, they ex-
pected many of the comforts of middle-class American life, at least being able to live
in desirable locations.
119. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-e (McKinney Supp. 1983-84).
120. A typical disclaimer stated: "THE FILING OF THIS PLAN WITH THE DEPART-
MENT OF LAW OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK DOES NOT CONSTITUTE APPROVAL OF
THE ISSUE OR THE SALE THEREOF BY THE DEPARTMENT OF LAW OR THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK. ANY REPRESENTATION TO THE CONTRARY
Is UNLAWFUL." (Offering plan, a plan to convert to cooperative ownership, 133-137
Greene Street, Manhattan).
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buyer beware. For the sale of cooperative units in loft buildings this
warning process failed.
The cooperative sale of lofts began in 1966 when an artist "work-
ing in the dadaist tradition of anarchistic and irreverant art"' z had a
vision that artists needed to own their lofts. One would not expect
the requirements of the General Business Law to trouble an anarchis-
tic artist and this one was not. Loft buildings were "sold" without
offering plans, sometimes without even legally transferring title. An-
archy did have its advantage: lofts were sold for $1.00 or less per
square foot compared to as much as $2.00 per square foot if offering
plans had been filed. In contrast to this, by 1981 residential coopera-
tive lofts sold for $100 per square foot.
The problems with this approach surfaced quickly. Artists desired
to protect their property interests. Eventually the attorney general
stepped in. However, because his mission was to protect the con-
sumer, and consumers were now the owners of these buildings, inval-
idating these illegal cooperatives was not acceptable public policy.'
Illegality had won round one.
Round two was more complicated. Offering plans were submitted
to the attorney general and accepted for filing by his office. The front
cover of a plan resembled the warning on a pack of cigarettes:
"THIS OFFERING INVOLVES CERTAIN RISKS, AMONG
WHICH IS THAT THE PREMISES ARE NOT AND CANNOT
PRESENTLY LAWFULLY BE OCCUPIED FOR RESIDENTIAL
PURPOSES."'' 2 3 Inside the offering plan were one or two other
warnings about the illegality of living in these lofts. Nevertheless, the
offering plan usually went on to describe the "apartments," tax bene-
fits available under the Internal Revenue Code for home ownership
and, most incredibly, a proprietary lease which sometimes required
that the loft be used for residential purposes only.
The attorney general took the position that he only would require
"full disclosure" and that the warnings constituted such disclosure. 124
121. C. SIMPSON, SoHo: THE ARTIST IN THE CITY 155-56 (1981).
122. In 1975, the attorney general established a procedure, Cooperative Policy
Statement 4 (CPS 4), for illegally sold cooperatives to file offering plans after the fact.
123. Offering Plan, 133-137 Greene Street, Manhattan.
124. Conversation with Joel DeFern of the attorney general's staff. Gerald Cole-
man, an official of the United Hatters, Cap, and Millinery Workers International
Union, when recounting his own conversation with the attorney general's staff re-
peated the rhetorical question: "Would the attorney general's office accept for filing
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If people occupied lofts in violation of city building and zoning laws,
the city should enforce those laws. Whenever the city moved against
a cooperative, which was always after the consumers had bought
in,12 5 the cooperative loft dwellers asserted the state attorney general
had "allowed" them to buy in. They stated the city should prosecute
the sponsor who was gone. If the sponsor had not participated in the
conversion itself, he or she had not broken city law, or, in the inter-
pretation of the attorney general, state law either. Illegality had won
round two. Given such enforcement paralysis, potential loft dwellers
believed that the government was giving the process its blessing.
Although consumers purchasing the loft did not ask for protection,
manufacturers screamed for regulation. In mid-1978 the New York
State Legislature finally acted. It amended the General Business Law
to require that the attorney general could only accept an offering plan
involving the conversion of a nonresidential building to residential
use if the sponsor had obtained approved plans from the Department
of Buildings. This made certain that the proposed conversion comply
with all zoning and building codes.' 2 6 Furthermore, the sponsor was
required to complete all common area work in accordance with those
plans.
The city and state sent other mixed signals to the loft conversion
market. To assist in the production of housing, they offered two tax
exemption and abatement programs. The 421 program, designed to
spur new housing construction, also can be used for conversions.
Under this program, property with new housing units is exempted
from any increase in assessment resulting from the new residences.'
27
The amount of the exemption declines on a sliding scale over a ten-
year period. The J-51 program 28 was much more generous. Both of
these programs were available only for buildings with a residential
certificate of occupancy, which represented only a small fraction of
the conversions. Nevertheless, they had a dramatic effect, particu-
larly J-51.
an offering plan for an obviously illegal activity such as an opium den as long as there
was full disclosure?"
125. Ironically, the city's first actions against illegal conversions often occurred
when such conversions sought an ex post facto variance from zoning restrictions
prohibiting residential use in manufacturing zones. Examples include 280-290 Lafay-
ette Street (BSA Cal. No. 670-77BZ) and 644 Broadway (BSA Cal. No. 488-78BZ).
126. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW, § 352-ee (McKinney Supp. 1983-84).
127. N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 421 (McKinney 1984).
128. NEw YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § J51-2.5(b)(2) (Supp. 1980-81).
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Developers and loft dwellers contended that they were only doing
what the city's J-51 program wanted--converting lofts to housing.
From a land-use standpoint, the abatement programs were a disaster.
The zoning prohibited conversion in manufacturing areas, the gov-
ernment was prepared to subsidize it if the Board of Standards and
Appeals (BSA) would grant a zoning variance.
The BSA is the Zoning Resolution's safety valve. Legally, it allows
a property owner who is unable to achieve a reasonable return on his
property because of the zoning restrictions to use the property in a
more profitable manner. 2 9 Practically, the BSA can use its power to
grant variances from the zoning requirements to permit development
not authorized by generic zoning categories but which the Board nev-
ertheless feels is desirable. Although BSA decisions are subject to
review in the courts, 13 0 the courts view the BSA as a body of experts
and rarely overturn their decisions.13 1
Between 1971, when the BSA heard its first loft case, and 1979 the
BSA granted eighty-nine variances to permit loft conversions--or to
legalize existing ones-and denied none. Whether the building was
large or small, whether it had been vacant for many years or the
manufacturing tenants were in the process of being forced out, the
BSA always found a reason to grant the variance.
Sheltered by its "independence"-BSA members cannot be re-
moved from office except for cause during their terms-BSA deci-
sions increasingly conflicted with the city's public commitment to
protect manufacturing. Everyone involved in illegal loft conversion,
developers and consumers alike, came to believe that it did not mat-
ter which laws or policies were being flaunted: if they were caught
they could obtain a variance to legalize from the BSA. In 1980, when
the city's belated loft policy was in the public review process, the
BSA finally denied two variance applications for illegally-converted
129. NEW YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION § 72-21 (1961); CHARTER OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK § 666 (1963).
130. In 1977, an amendment to the City Charter gave the Board of Estimate, a
quasi-legislative body, the power to review BSA decisions and to overturn variances if
they were not supported by substantial evidence in the BSA record. Although the
BSA's decisions have been overturned frequently through this process, the courts
often reinstate the BSA's variance decisions.
131. Falvo v. Kerner, 222 App. Div. 289, 225 N.Y.S. 747 (1927). See2 R. ANDER-
SON, NEw YORK ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE 206 (1973).
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buildings.' 32
The city's method for assessing loft buildings also encouraged the
spread of illegal conversion. During the early years of conversion, in
the 1960s and early 1970s, the city assessed loft buildings for indus-
trial use. At the time, these assessments reflected the value as the
highly desireable industrial buildings they once were. Assessments
were quite high for the amount of industry that occupied them. Nev-
ertheless, they were lower than they would have been if assessed as
converted lofts. Loft dwellers, therefore, became the beneficiaries of
this bargain.
Toward the end of the 1970s, prices for residential lofts soared.
Assessors realized how underassessed loft buildings had become and
began to reevaluate. This reassessment included both converted lofts
and potentially residential lofts. In a bizarre development, the asses-
sors increased the assessment of at least one industrially-used loft
building in a zoning district that did not even permit conversion. Re-
ferring to all the illegal conversions, the assessors argued that the
owner could have converted the loft illegally. It was not until 1981
that the city adopted a policy that did not penalize an owner of an
industrial building with manufacturing tenants.33
Money made illegal conversion a powerful force. The early rental
buildings required very litle work because improvements were mod-
est and usually made by the incoming residential tenant. The tenant
later "sold" his improvements to the next tenant for a "fixture fee."' 3 4
Beginning with the first primitive cooperatives, capital was needed to
acquire a building. Initially, this came from foundation grants.
These foundations were supportive of the notion of artist coopera-
tives. This source soon dried up, as the grantors either were fright-
ened by the fire hazards or interested in larger, more legitimate
artists' housing projects.' 35
For the next several years, conversion was financed without institu-
tional support. The previous owner took back a purchase money
132. 151 West 28 Street (BSA Cal. No. 1070-79BZ) and 40 West 24 Street (BSA
Cal. No. 665-79BZ).
133. In 1981, city assessors agreed to stop assessing industrial buildings at their
potential residential value.
134. In New York State, unless the lease provides otherwise, such fixtures (e.g.,
kitchens, bathrooms, and other tenant-added improvements) are the property of the
landlord. As the value of the fixtures increased with the growing popularity of lofts,
many landlords refused to permit tenants to sell their fixtures.
135. C. SIMPSON, supra note 121, at 156-57.
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mortgage. The downpayment came from the developer's pocket or
from preselling shares in the cooperative. By 1974, legal conversion
was beginning and banks started lending funds. As conversion be-
came popular and banks became aware of the lucrative potential of
illegal conversions, they began to make loans to finance the purchase
of individual cooperative lofts without inquiry into the legality of the
conversion.
It was not until 1978 that the banks realized that financing illegal
conversions was a risky venture. Although the city's enforcement of
the law was no concern-because nobody believed the city could or
would enforce-the marketplace posed two risks. First, most loft
buildings were insured as industrial property. If substantial damages
resulted from the injury or death of an illegal loft dweller, an insur-
ance company might use illegality to avoid liability. The uninsured
bank loans were not secure. The city's policy of reassessing lofts at
their residential value created a second risk for lenders: if the assess-
ments jumped to full value as required by law, taxes would increase
by several hundred percent, beyond the financial capacity of many of
the loft dwellers. Although the J-51 programs offered a way to re-
duce taxes dramatically, illegal conversions did not qualify for the
benefit.
At least a decade passed before the loft conversion movement coa-
lesced and another decade passed before it developed the mecha-
nisms for its rapid growth. By 1975, all the elements for the survival
of the conversion movement were in place. Then, like the dinosaur
overpopulating and destroying its habitat, the movement's expansion
proceeded to consume the very environment that nurtured it.
VII. NEW YORK CITY'S MANHATTAN LOFT PROGRAM
Between the issuance of recommendations by the Task Force on
Loft Conversion in July 1978 and the mayor's announcement of his
administration's loft program in September 1980, battling constituen-
cies pushed and pulled at a government caught up in its own interne-
cine debate. The discussion concerned the response to an
increasingly large and agitated public with widely differing concerns
about loft conversions.
The city recognized that additional minor zoning changes would
be useless. In consultation with the city planning, buildings, housing,
cultural affairs, appeals board, and economic development agencies,
the mayor set forth a comprehensive and innovative program that
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required various city and state actions.136 A six-part program ulti-
mately was approved.
A. Zoning Amendments that Regulate all Conversions in Manhattan
South of 59th Street
The amendments 137 liberalized legal conversion, increasing by
seven million square feet the amount of convertible loft space to a
total of eighty-seven million square feet. 138 As a practical matter, the
amendments increased the amount of loft space protected from con-
version from zero to seventy-two million square feet.
The Planning Commission categorized loft neighborhoods accord-
ing to four criteria for evaluation: 1) importance of industrial activ-
ity;' 39 2) building size and location; 40 3) existing conversion;14 1 and
4) availability of residential services. 142 The evaluations resulted in
the division of loft neighborhoods into three types of zoning districts:
manufacturing districts, which prohibit conversion; commercial dis-
tricts, which permit as-of-right conversion; and mixed-use districts,
which permit some conversion but mandate the preservation of sub-
stantial space for commercial or manufacturing use. In the old
mixed-use districts (SoHo/NoHo and Tribeca), space is preserved by
restricting conversion to buildings with smaller floor sizes. In the
new mixed-use areas of midtown (Southeast Chelsea and Garment
Center East), a portion of each building may be converted based on
lot size and floor area; the remainder must be preserved for commer-
cial or manufacturing use. To permit developers the option of fully
136. DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, PROPOSED MANHATTAN LOFT POLICY
(1980) contained five of the six elements. It would take almost two years for the sixth
element, Article 7C, to take shape and win approval.
137. These amendments to the zoning resolution were calendared as zoning text
change N800458ZRM and zoning map changes C800459ZMM.
138. Of this total, an estimated 20,000,000 to 30,000,000 square feet already have
been converted. The 87,000,000 square feet represent the potential amount of conver-
sion permitted in all districts where residential use is as-of-right.
139. DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, PRELIMINARY REPORT MANHATTAN
LOFT CONVERSION PROPOSAL 29 (1980). When industrial occupancy rates are high or
when firms of a particular industry cluster together, industry should be protected.
140. Id. Areas with higher concentrations of smaller loft buildings were consid-
ered more appropriate for conversion than areas with mostly larger buildings.
141. Id Areas that had experienced significant amounts of conversion were more
appropriate for conversion than areas with little existing conversion.
142. Id Neighborhoods with good access to existing residential services were ac-
ceptable locations for residential conversion.
1984]
Washington University Open Scholarship
198 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 27:157
residential and fully nonresidential buildings in the new mixed-use
areas, "conversion rights" and "preservation obligations" may be
transferred between buildings. In both the old and new mixed-use
districts, a Planning Commission special permit allows the conver-
sion of the "preserved space." The special permit is tied to market
conditions. If the market for nonresidential space is strong, the Com-
mission generally cannot grant the special permit. It becomes easier
to make the findings required for the permit if the market for such
space softens. To ensure an adequate living environment, the
amendments incorporate housing standards into the zoning, which
regulate density, apartment size, apartment dimensions, and rooftop
open space.
The zoning amendments institutionalized the role of the manufac-
turing sector to ensure that its concerns were aired in considering fu-
ture land use changes. To accomplish this result, the Industrial Loft
Advisory Council (ILAC) was created consisting of representatives
from the various segments of the industrial community.
B. A Relocation Incentive Program that Applies to all Conversions
Affected by the Zoning Amendments
By offering substantial financial assistance to industrial firms dis-
placed by conversion,'43 the city sought to encourage these firms to
relocate within New York City. The program is paid for entirely
with funds supplied by developers.' The relocation payments gen-
erally are sufficient to cover all of a displaced firm's moving expenses.
143. NEW YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION §§ 15-50 to -582 (1981).
144. NEW YORK CITY PLANNING COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 32:
Prior to the issuance of a building permit a developer of a loft building would be
required to pay a $9 per square foot "conversion contribution" to the. . . Busi-
ness Relocation Assistance Corporation (BRAC). A developer. . . [is] able to
take advantage of a 50 percent discount by making a $4.50 per square foot "di-
rect help payment" available to his tenants at the time of relocation. Tenants
relocating in New York would receive the benefit from this direct help payment.
Manufacturing establishments would receive the full $4.50, while other industrial
type tenants [such as warehouses] would receive $2.25 per square foot. Any
funds not received by such tenants would go to BRAC to provide relocation
assistance where needed.
In 1983, the conversion contribution was raised to $10.60 per square foot.
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C. Limiting Tax Incentives for Conversion to Zoning Districts that
Permit Residential Use ofAs-of-Right
Because tax incentives play a crucial role in institutional financing
of conversion, targeting them away from manufacturing districts
reduces the inducement for conversions in these areas.
D. Amendments to Article 7B of the New York State Multiple
Dwelling Law
These amendments'45 further simplify standards for fire protec-
tion, egress, light and air, and make conversion less expensive with-
out compromising safety.
E. An Enforcement Program to Stop New Illegal Conversion and
Oversee the Legalization of Currently Occupied Illegal
Loft Buildings
For the first time in two decades, land use, building, and tax regu-
lations were coordinated with each other and with the realities of the
marketplace. Thus, the marketplace functioned within the law.
Yet, credible enforcement was essential for the loft program to
overcome two decades of illegality. A special enforcement effort,
placed in the mayor's office, emphasized the seriousness of the city's
commitment to stop illegal loft conversion. Since early 1981, when
the zoning was adopted and the enforcement office established, ille-
gal conversions of buildings have ceased in Manhattan.
The Mayor's Office of Loft Enforcement (MOLE) combined the
inspection function of the Department of Buildings and the litigation
capabilities of the Law Department into one small unit of planners,
inspectors, investigators, and attorneys. Through investigations, in-
spections, and civil litigation, MOLE demonstrated that a small office
devoted exclusively to the goal of preventing new illegal loft conver-
sion by enforcing the zoning, administrative, and other codes, effec-
tively can persuade potential illegal converters that the era of illegal
loft conversion is over.
In New York zoning and code enforcement proceedings violators
are issued summonses; if conditions are not corrected, a minimal fine
is levied. This hardly deters a multimillion dollar illegal conversion.
The Law Department rarely takes more affirmative action in zoning
145. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW. §§ 275-78 (McKinney Supp. 1983-84).
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matters, relegating such items a low priority in a complex city.
MOLE was not given any extraordinary enforcement powers, but
concentrated solely on one enforcement priority. MOLE's capability
of rapidly sending inspectors to problem spots permits staff attorneys
to petition the civil court expeditiously to obtain restraining orders,
injunctions, fines, and building closures.
Zoning works best when it is self-enforcing. The ultimate testa-
ment to MOLE's success will occur when voluntary compliance is the
norm rather than the exception.'4 6 At that time, special enforcement
will no longer be needed. In September 1982, MOLE became a part
of the New York City Loft Board's staff.
F. Enactment of Article 7C of the New York State Multiple
Dwelling Law
Article 7C establishes a Loft Board to oversee code compliance of
illegal loft buildings and to mediate landlord-tenant disputes during
the process.14 7 This new statute, called the "Loft Law" and enacted
in June 1982, compels owners to legalize their illegally-occupied
buildings. It defines these buildings as "interim multiple dwellings"
if they contain three or more units that were occupied on April 1,
1980, in an area where the zoning permits residential use.14 8 Property
owners must register these buildings with the Loft Board, file an al-
teration application, obtain a building permit and receive a residen-
tial certificate of occupancy within three to five years."49 The cost of
code compliance is passed on to tenants based on a Loft Board sched-
ule of costs that is amortized over a ten or fifteen year period.'50
When a certificate of occupancy is obtained, the building ceases to
be "interim" and becomes a "Class A" multiple dwelling that leaves
the Loft Board's purview. Thereafter, the dwelling unit is folded into
the rent stabilization system that mandates rent renewals at the op-
tion of the tenant at fixed percentages established by New York
City's Rent Guidelines Board. The mayor appointed the members of
the Loft Board in October 1982. Its responsibilities are to determine
whether a building is an interim multiple dwelling, resolve hardship
146. Weisbrod, supra note 116, at 56.
147. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW §§ 280-87 (McKinney Supp. 1983-84).
148. Id. §§ 281(1)-(3).
149. Id. § 284(1)(i).
150. Id § 286(5).
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applications, adjudicate claims for rent adjustment, issue and enforce
minimum housing maintenance standards, and resolve disputes over
the fair market value of fixtures.
The Loft Board has been sorting out the thorny problems of land-
lord-tenant relations. Although some tenants and owners desire to
legalize, many see little to be gained. For tenants, legalizing means
substantial rent increases, although ultimately they will possess a
rent-stabilized unit that eventually will become a bargain. For the
owner, it mandates operating a residential building and expending
large sums of money to make the building code compliant, which will
take years to recoup through increased rents. Because the market for
office use of lofts has improved, many loft owners would rather va-
cate their residential tenants and restore their buildings to commer-
cial use.
Owners may submit a hardship application to the Loft Board to
vacate residential units if either the costs of code compliance are ex-
cessive in terms of the future return or code compliance will displace
commercial and industrial tenants in the building. If the Loft Board
grants a hardship, the owner must file an irrevocable covenant stating
that the space will remain in nonresidential use for fifteen years.
VIII. THE LOFT PROGRAM'S PUBLIC REVIEW PROCESS
An almost unprecedented cooperative effort between the planning,
housing, enforcement, economic development, buildings, cultural af-
fairs, and appeals agencies contributed to the development of the
city's loft program. This cooperation also was evident in the discus-
sions between government officials and the interested members of the
public.
To facilitate the discussion of the proposal, the city undertook an
interagency public information effort that remains intact. Prior to the
adoption of the new zoning, the Planning Commission published a
book'' specifically written to maximize public awareness and elicit
public responses. The publication contained the Planning Commis-
sion report in zoning parlance and plain English explaining the Com-
mission's recommendations and their effects.
The initial reaction to the proposed loft program resulted in almost
universal criticism. Manufacturers and their unions opposed al-
lowing any conversion. Residential loft tenants wanted the city to
151. NEW YORK CITY PLANNING COMMISSION, supra note 1.
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delay implementing the rest of the proposal until the state approved
Article 7C. In an effort to stop the zoning, they supported the manu-
facturers in urging its defeat. Developers wanted more conversion,
but not more regulation. They called for the defeat of the proposal
but attributed their opposition to a professed concern for protecting
manufacturing. Civic organizations and community boards gener-
ally expressed qualified approval but joined the chorus calling for
additional protection of industry.
This political lineup greatly strengthened the manufacturing sec-
tor's position. It also simplifed the job of negotiating a revised pro-
gram. If the manufacturers and their unions could be convinced to
support the proposal, their opponents would have no choice but to
cooperate.
The city made substantive changes to accommodate industry while
making numerous technical zoning changes requested by the various
parties. This combination of changes resulted in a more workable
and politically acceptable program than the city's original proposal,
and led to the approval of all six parts of the program.
IX. EVALUATION OF THE LOFT PROGRAM
In an era of decreasing public support for government regulation
of private industry, New York City chose to intervene in the loft mar-
ketplace. The city's loft program has been in operation since 1981.
New York's mayor often asks, "How'm I doin'?" It is important to
ask the same question of the city's loft program. It has three major
goals: providing new housing in converted buildings, protecting
manufacturing space from competing residential uses, and bringing
illegally-converted lofts into compliance with appropriate building
codes. The question arises whether these goals are being met.
A. Providing New Housing in Converted Loft Buildings
Since the passage of the loft zoning amendments in 1981, develop-
ers have continued converting loft buildings to residential use, but
the rate of conversion is slower than it was during its heyday in the
late 1970s. 52 This is due in part to the 1981 and 1983153 changes
152. Most legal loft conversions receive J-51 tax abatement. A building is eligible
for J-51 when it has a temporary or final certificate of occupancy. A 1983 Loft Board
study (based on statistics from the City's Department of Housing Preservation and
Development of former industrial buildings converted citywide to multiple dwellings
that received J-5 1) showed the following: 1979-37 buildings (1,464 units); 1980-55
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limiting the applicability of the J-51 tax abatement and exemption
program for conversions, and the loft program's requirement that de-
velopers who displace manufacturers contribute to a relocation fund.
Although it ranges from zero to four percent of the total project
cost, depending upon its impact on land cost, the relocation payment
can increase a developer's up-front cash requirement by as much as
seventy-five percent. The slowdown in the conversion rate is also at-
tributable to changing market conditions unrelated to the loft pro-
gram. Many developers, including some former loft developers, now
invest in new residential construction in Manhattan. Another factor
in the conversion slowdown is the steep rise in office rents in midtown
Manhattan, which has displaced many small office users, particularly
architecture, law, graphic design, publishing, and advertising firms.
Beginning in the early 1980s, these businesses began moving to loft
buildings in downtown Manhattan that offered lower rents as well as
unusual, high-ceilinged spaces, which were considered acceptable
even desirable alternatives to the modem glass box buildings of mid-
town. Owners began converting loft buildings to office uses because
office tenants pay higher rents than manufacturers and are believed
to cause fewer problems than residential tenants.154 Newly-gentrified
neighborhoods, like SoHo, also created new demands for high-priced
retail and service businesses downtown. These changes in the com-
mercial real estate market have affected significantly the rate of loft
conversions.
Although the loft program was not the major factor in slowing the
conversion rate, it did delay inadvertently individual conversions
proposed shortly after its enactment. Some delay was inevitable; the
rules and administrative procedures governing conversions had
changed drastically and developers were unfamiliar with them.
These rules also were complicated. To obtain a building permit, even
for an as-of-right conversion, a developer may have to deal with as
buildings (1,458 units); 1981-70 buildings (1,703 units); and 1982-62 buildings
(2,567 units). The 1983 and 1984 data are available only for conversions of nonresi-
dential buildings to multiple dwellings. This includes the conversion of buildings
such as hospitals, schools, and offices in addition to lofts. These figures are: 1983-75
buildings (1,909 units); and 1984-40 buildings (732 units).
153. In 1983, J-51 was eliminated in some parts of Manhattan and its benefits
reduced considerably in others. These changes were not linked to the loft program.
154. In addition to saving relocation costs, developers of office conversions can
avoid concern about the legal protections available to residential tenants in New York
City.
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many as five city agencies. City officials aggravated these problems
by not moving quickly to implement the loft program after it was
passed. They had concentrated their efforts on building public sup-
port for the program while it was in its planning and public review
stage, and gave little thought to the mechanics of its administration.
Consequently, the first projects reviewed under the loft zoning were
delayed while city agencies promulgated new application forms,
trained staff to review applications, and set up new processing
procedures.
The Department of City Planning set up a loft conversion unit in
1981 to process applications for new conversions and residential
"grandfathering, '  and to study a number of still unresolved loft
policy questions.' 56 Nevertheless, considerable time was added to
the approval process in these cases.' 57 By forcing residents in illegal
loft buildings to file for grandfathering by a specified date in order to
protect their rights of occupancy, however, the city removed the in-
centive for them to remain in hiding and helped overcome the belief
of many tenants that illegality is preferable to regulation.' 58
The most common criticisms of the loft zoning are that it is too
complex, too lengthy, and too difficult to understand. The adminis-
trative processes also are criticized as excessively cumbersome. The
loft zoning covers a wide variety of special situations. It did not,
155. "Grandfathering" is "a zoning technique which permits certain existing ille-
gal residential loft tenants to become legal non-conforming uses in a particular dis-
trict. The legalization is dependent on the dwelling units conforming to the
requirements of the New York Multiple Dwelling Law, the Building Code, and the
obtaining of a new Certificate of Occupancy." NEW YORK CITY PLANNING COMMIS-
SION, supra note I, at 149.
156. Among the issues were the artist-only provisions of SoHo and NoHo, the
need for appropriate regulations for loft areas in Brooklyn and Queens, and the reuse
of loft buildings for offices.
157. A sampling of eight special permit applications made to the City Planning
Commission for residential grandfathering showed that an average of 12 months
passed before the Commission made a recommendation to the Board of Estimate,
which adopts, denies, or modifies the Commission's recommendation. In accordance
with § 197(c) of the New York City Charter, special permits must pass through a
public review process, which takes a minimum of four months. NEW YORK, N.Y.,
CITY CHARTER § 197(c) (1976 & Supp. 1983-84). Also, some delay may be attributa-
ble simply to the stafis desire for additional information from applicants.
158. The sunset date for residential grandfathering was June 1983; approximately
2,500 units filed for grandfathering. This is in contrast to the response to the rezoning
of SoHo and NoHo in 1976, which permitted legalization. By September 1978, only
six percent of the illegally-occupied buildings had obtained certificates of occupancy.
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however, anticipate all the special problems that arise in the conver-
sion of older buildings. Some zoning text changes have been re-
quired since 1981. Processing these changes takes at least three
months and contributes to start-up delays of affected projects.
All of these problems exasperated developers, many of whom were
skeptical of the zoning amendments from the outset because they be-
lieved that the city was cutting back on conversion. In 1981, how-
ever, the city rezoned seven million square feet of loft space to allow
for as-of-right residential conversions.159 Now, the initial problems
in implementing the zoning aspects of the loft program have been
resolved.
B. Protecting Manufacturing Space
For manufacturers occupying loft space in Manhattan, the loft pro-
gram generally has succeeded in reducing the threat of displacement.
The zoning enforcement efforts of MOLE and its successor agency,
the New York City Loft Board, have stopped seventy-one illegal con-
versions in Manhattan and Brooklyn between July 1981 and Decem-
ber 1983.16° The success of these efforts is attributable largely to the
loft program's combination of several mechanisms: 1) zoning
changes that channelled conversions to certain areas of the city and
away from others; 2) changes in the J-51 tax abatement and exemp-
tion; and 3) provisions for relocation payments to displaced manufac-
turers that served as disincentives for development in areas not
considered suitable for residential conversions.
16 1
Three other changes in the conversion market facilitated the suc-
cess of the loft enforcement program: 1) the growing popularity of
commercial as opposed to residential conversions; 2) the dearth of
159. The 1981 loft zoning amendments technically were more liberal in regulating
conversion. Because the former regulations routinely had been ignored, however, the
1981 zoning had the effect of being more restrictive.
160. OFFICE OF LoFT ENFORCEMENT, FINAL REPORT OCTOBER 1, 1980-SEPTEM-
BER 30, 1982 10-11 (1984); NEW YORK CITY LoFT BOARD, REPORT OCTOBER 1, 1982-
DECEMBER 31, 1983 9 (1984).
161. Free market advocates have argued that high interests rates and liberalized
zoning--not the city's loft program-is responsible for the reduction in illegal activ-
ity. This argument is not supported by the history of conversions. In the 1970s the
city liberalized zoning that affected lofts on three occasions, with little impact on the
number of illegal residential conversions. Moreover, when interest rates climbed
above 20%, illegal activity continued unabated. Finally, illegal conversions, which
usually were not financed institutionally, historically have been immune to interest
rate fluctuation.
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inexpensive loft buildings suitable for conversion; and 3) the realiza-
tion by consumers and lending institutions of the liabilities involved
in investing in illegal residential buildings.
Since 1981 several persons attempted to obtain zoning variances
for residential use of lofts. Among these were two in the Graphic
Arts Center, a reaffirmed manufacturing district. These attempts so
contravened the loft program that, if granted, they would have bro-
ken the policy. The BSA denied these applications) 62 As a result, a
number of buildings that were on the market for residential conver-
sion in manufacturing districts instead have been leased for manufac-
turing or commercial use. In another important instance, the City
Planning Commission denied a special permit for residential use of a
vacant building in NoHo, 163 formerly used for manufacturing, be-
cause the owner did not renew leases and did not undertake a good
faith effort to market the space for nonresidential use. The owner is
now converting the building for office use. These and other denials
for variances and special permits have dampened developer enthusi-
asm for seeking exceptions to the land use policy. 164
The continued success of the loft program in preserving manufac-
turing space, however, increasingly may be compromised by the Loft
Board's lack of attention to zoning enforcement. MOLE, which now
serves as the enforcement arm of the Board, is involved increasingly
in administering several key provisions of Article 7C. This includes
enforcing the registration of loft buildings as interim multiple dwell-
ings (IMDs), processing tenant service complaints, and determining
whether owners are meeting legalization deadlines prescribed by Ar-
ticle 7C.
The most serious potential threat to manufacturers, however, is the
trend to office conversions in Manhattan's loft neighborhoods. The
loft program only addressed the competition between manufacturers
and residential tenants. As a result, the city lacks an existing mecha-
nism for regulating office conversions. Moreover, the city is only now
in the process of developing a policy to deal with these conversions.
Since 1981, city staff has studied the effect of conversions on the city's
162. 627 Greenwich Street, Manhattan (BSA Cal. No. 182-81BZ); 636 Greenwich
Street, Manhattan (BSA Cal. No. 1104-80BZ).
163. 656 Broadway, Manhattan (CPC No. C820248ZSM).
164. The City Planning Commission also has denied permission to convert vacant
floors in a number of partially-converted buildings. E.g., 419 Lafayette Street, Man-
hattan (CPC No. C820987ZSM).
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economy but has not yet reached any conclusions. The city, however,
is attempting to mitigate the negative impact of office conversions on
manufacturing. Recently, the city has implemented the Industrial
Retention Program that provides grants to manufacturers who relo-
cate from certain loft neighborhoods in Manhattan, Brooklyn, and
Queens to outlying areas of the city. Many manufacturers, however,
are wary of moving to areas that are not readily accessible by public
transportation, lack support services, and have high crime rates.
Whether or not the Retention Program will succeed is speculative.
Two other proposed ideas remain under review. One idea recom-
mends the building of new, publicly-subsidized industrial space on
underutilized land in Manhattan west of the Garment Center. The
second proposal would make conversion of certain manufacturing
buildings to offices the subject of a special permit review process. To
date, no city officials have committed themselves to the desirability or
feasibility of either approach.
Other safeguards for manufacturers included in the city's loft pro-
gram have enjoyed limited success-notably the establishment of a
manufacturing advisory board and the Business Relocation Assist-
ance Corporation.
The loft zoning mandated the establishment of an Industrial Loft
Advisory Council (ILAC), which was intended to give manufacturing
a voice in city government. It formed slowly, taking fifteen months to
hold its first meeting and convening only intermittently since then.
ILAC has taken positions on particular variance and special permit
applications, rezoning proposals, and Loft Board policies. ILAC's
opposition to two variance applications played a part in the with-
drawal of one and the denial of the other. Because its fifteen mem-
bers are part-time and unsalaried, however, ILAC is unable to
address the broad range of issues affecting manufacturers. The staff
of ILAC is assigned by the city's economic development agency,
comproming its ability to act independently on city-supported
projects. It is uncertain whether ILAC will have the long-term effect
on government decisionmaking envisioned by the drafters of the loft
program.
The Relocation Incentive Program encourages developers to make
relocation payments directly to manufacturers. From September
1982 to July 1984 developers paid approximately $1,088,000 for relo-
cation directly to forty-nine manufacturing firms (representing 484
jobs) that conversion had displaced, for relocation in the city. After
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an initial start-up delay, the BSA won praise for administering com-
pliance with the relocation program. Although developers dislike
paying relocation money, they have accepted it as a business cost. A
city survey indicated that approximately one-third of the firms in-
volved based their decision to remain in New York City on the avail-
ability of these funds.165 The Relocation Incentive Program's success
rate in this regard has been better than expected, considering the suc-
cess rate of several tax abatement programs.
166
The Business Relocation Assistance Corporation (BRAC), a part
of the relocation program, has not functioned as well as expected. To
date, most of the converted floor space has not involved tenants who
qualify for relocation money because: there is no industrial tenant to
relocate; the conversion is of vacant space; the tenant relocates to
smaller space; the tenant fails to claim the benefits within the statu-
tory timeframe; or the tenant is only eligible for the lower benefit
category. In these cases, BRAC collects the money for use by other
tenants who require more relocation money and by other targeted
recipients. By June 1984, BRAC had collected about two million
dollars from developers. None of this money, although available to
assist manufacturers, has been spent. The Relocation Incentive Pro-
gram has had some success in assisting displaced manufacturers, but
until BRAC begins to distribute this considerable amount of money,
the relocation program will not realize its full potential.
Still, although manufacturers face stiff competition for space in
Manhattan and assistance programs operate imperfectly, the loft pro-
gram has alleviated the pressure of residential conversion on the
city's manufacturing firms. On balance, the manufacturing commu-
nity is supportive of the city's loft program and considers it a quali-
fied success.
C. Code Compliance for Illegally-Occupied Lofts
The third and final goal of the loft program is to ensure that in-
terim multiple dwellings comply with Article 7C. This goal has not
yet been met. In fact, the Loft Board has yet to promulgate regula-
165. OFFICE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, SUMMARY OF FINDINGS: SURVEY OF
RECIPIENTS OF RELOCATION ASSISTANCE THROUGH BRAC 2 (Report, 1983).
Although technically incorrect, the acronym BRAC is often used to refer to the Relo-
cation Incentive Program.
166. See D. MANDELKER, G. FEDER & M. COLLINS, REVIVING CITIES WITH TAX
ABATEMENT 34, 36 (1980).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol27/iss1/5
LOFT CONVERSIONS
tions implementing Article 7C's code compliance scheme16 7 and,
once implemented, the scheme will take up to five years to complete
the legalization of an estimated one thousand IMDs with their six
thousand dwelling units. If these units are not legalized, the success
of the entire loft program will be seriously undermined.
The delay in promulgating code compliance regulations already
has compromised the statutory code compliance scheme. Article 7C
requires owners to legalize in stages, according to a specified timeta-
ble. Because code compliance regulations have not been issued, this
timetable effectively has been mooted. Owners cannot be expected to
begin code compliance work within their buildings before the Board
gives them notice of how the work should be performed and how its
costs will be allocated among tenants. As a result, the June 1985
deadline set forth by Article 7C for obtaining a final certificate of
occupancy will have no effect in most cases.168
The inability of the Loft Board to proceed rapidly is not surprising.
The Board's effectiveness was hampered at the outset by the deep
mistrust and rancor that permeates relations between loft owners and
tenants, many of whom do not appear to want to legalize or to be
regulated at all, and by the complexity of the tasks assigned to the
Board by Article 7C. These problems are worth examining in brief.
Because of the difficulties the state legislature encountered in forg-
ing a compromise between owners and tenants, it took two years to
pass Article 7C. The bill that the legislature finally enacted left open
some very sensitive questions for resolution by the Loft Board., 6 9
These included determining: 1) The residential occupant covered by
the law; 2) the appropriate level of residential services in IMDs and
allocating their costs; 3) the manner in which to measure the "fair
market value" of fixtures, which is the price at which outgoing ten-
167. The Loft Board has scheduled a vote on code compliance regulation for Feb-
ruary 1985.
168. Article 7C mandates interim multiple dwellings to obtain certificates of occu-
pancy by June 1985, although the Board may grant two one-year extensions if reason-
able progress is made toward code compliance. As of August 1984, 636 buildings
were registered as interim multiple dwellings with the Loft Board; of these, 434 have
filed alteration applications for legalization. In addition, there are five applications at
the Loft Board for rent pass throughs to tenants in buildings that have become code
compliant since the passage of Article 7C.
169. N.Y. MuLT. DWELL. LAW. § 282 (McKinney Supp. 1983-84) (outlines the
duties of the Loft Board).
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ants may sell their fixtures to incoming tenants; 170 4) what code com-
pliance work is "necessary and reasonable" and should be paid for by
tenants in the form of rent increases; 5) allowable costs for code com-
pliance work; and 6) how rent pass throughs will be allocated among
individual tenants.
Meeting on a frequent basis since its inception in September 1982,
the Loft Board has enacted a number of regulations, several of which
address the questions noted above. These questions include the defi-
nition of "residential occupancy" and the determination of essential
residential services that building owners must provide. 17 1 In its two
years of operation, however, the Board has failed to pass regulations
governing the two most important and controversial areas: fixture
sales 172 and code compliance.
The biggest problems facing the Loft Board in promulgating regu-
lations consist of both the enmity between owners and tenants, and
the Board's own failure to reach a consensus on controversial ques-
tions. Occasionally, disputes among members effectively have para-
lyzed the Board.
The Board includes one owner representative (until October 1984
an owner of an interim multiple dwelling) and one tenant representa-
tive (a loft tenant). Each has used the Board as a forum for airing the
grievances of their constituents and has been unable or unwilling to
resolve differences with the other. Each side has the attitude that be-
ing legal protects their rights while placing restrictions on others.
They are reluctant to give up what they believe are the advantages of
illegality.' 73 The dissatisfaction of both owners and tenants with Ar-
170. Id § 286(6).
171. The Board also has passed regulations governing the registration of IMDs,
internal board procedures, and the processing of cases, fees, and hardship applica-
tions by owners seeking exemptions from Article 7C and interim rent guidelines.
172. The Loft Board has had difficulty with fixture regulations. Since May 1983,
it has held numerous public discussions and two public hearings on four different sets
of proposed fixture regulations. A vote on this regulation is scheduled for February
1985. The failure to issue regulations governing the sale of fixtures has contributed to
confusion regarding loft tenancies in general. Loft tenants who have moved in the
last two years were forced to sell their fixtures outside of the law, and many of these
sales ultimately may be voided by whatever regulation the Board finally adopts. The
effect of this on purchasing incoming tenants in unclear.
173. In this manner, the loft conversion phenomenon has exemplified the Ameri-
can Search for "absolute personal freedom, privacy,. . . the desire ... to be a free
agent, [and] live by one's own rules." J. DIDION, SLOUCHING TOWARDS BETHLEHEM
71(1968).
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ticle 7C and the Board itself has resulted in the filing of twenty-three
lawsuits against the Board by August 1984, including challenges to
some of its regulations.' 74
Exacerbating the effect of the conflicts between the tenant and
owner representatives on the Board is the inability of its four public
members to reach compromises-to define and support strong middle
positions between landlords and tenants. Thus, the Loft Board has
failed to articulate a coherent policy regarding the respective rights of
owners and tenants under Article 7C. This has limited the Board's
ability to promulgate regulations, undermined its credibility, and
contributed to a growing backlog of cases involving individual land-
lord-tenant disputes.
Ideally, code compliance for interim multiple dwellings will trans-
form substandard housing into legal, safe housing before the normal
impetus for government to respond occurs: a major disaster. In De-
cember 1983, two serious fires occurred in two illegal loft buildings,
resulting in one death. These events brought further urgency to the
critical task of ensuring rapid code compliance. If Article 7C is prop-
erly administered, it should effect a workable compromise between
loft owners and tenants that will keep lofts affordable for most ten-
ants and allow owners to make reasonable, if not maximum, profits
on their buildings.
From the least favorable viewpoint, interim multiple dwelling le-
galization is an experiment in mitigating the effects of gentrification
on a highly articulate and politically savvy group of middle- and up-
per-class tenants who arguably do not need the aid of the govern-
ment. Moreover, other neighborhoods in New York City are being
gentrified. Yet, the protections available to residents of these neigh-
borhoods may prove less encompassing than those provided to loft
tenants by Article 7C.
X. CONCLUSION
The ultimate success of the six-part loft program in preserving in-
dustrial space, encouraging residential conversions in appropriate
neighborhoods, and upgrading illegally-occupied lofts will depend
upon the willingness of city officials to evaluate the wisdom of their
174. This has hampered the Board's ability to enforce the zoning when legal ac-
tion is required. Its legal staff has been preoccupied with defending the Board in
these lawsuits, although the Board did commence four affirmative zoning actions in
the courts and one intervention during the same time period.
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loft policies and their success in implementing them. The loft pro-
gram is complicated. It requires the cooperation of several city agen-
cies, loft developers, building owners, and tenants. Its success also
will depend on its ability to respond to changing market conditions.
Since the implementation of the loft program, a knowledgeable
and concerned core staff in each of the agencies involved in adminis-
tering it has remained in almost daily contact and, for the most part,
has succeeded in resolving problems as they arise. Agency personnel
change over time.'75 Whether their replacements will have the same
experience and expertise in the area of loft conversions or the same
commitment to the success of the loft program remains to be seen.
The loft program was the subject of heated debates while it was in
the planning stage. Controversy over its inability to meet all of its
goals remains. The successes of the program so far, however, have
silenced most of its critics. Questions regarding the city's loft zoning,
relocation program, tax abatement policies, building code changes,
and enforcement efforts virtually have disappeared from the arena of
public debate. Significantly, a 1984 proposal to extend the zoning
and relocation program to Brooklyn and Queens generated no public
opposition. The ultimate success of the loft program, however, de-
pends on the successful upgrading and legalization of the almost one
thousand illegally-converted loft buildings within the Loft Board's
jurisdiction. Until these buildings are made code compliant, the loft
program cannot be fully and finally evaluated.
175. Only two of the original agency personnel who set up the loft program now
plays a major role in the implementation of any of its six parts.
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